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CURBING DISCOVERY ABUSE: SANCTIONS
UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE AND THE CALIFORNIA CODE
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Richard W. Sherwood*
I. INTRODUCTION
Civil discovery was incorporated into the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure "to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action."' Proponents of discovery be-
lieved that discovery procedures would "make a trial less a
game of blindman's bluff and more a fair contest with the ba-
sic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest possible extent."2
California also adopted discovery procedures, pursuing these
same goals. The California Supreme Court has stated that
"[o]ne of the principal [sic] purposes of discovery was to do
away 'with the sporting theory of litigation-namely, surprise
at the trial.' ,,8 The California court has also expressed other
discovery objectives:
(1) to give greater assistance to the parties in ascertaining
the truth and in checking and preventing perjury; (2) to
provide an effective means of detecting and exposing
false, fraudulent and sham claims and defenses; (3) to
make available, in a simple, convenient and inexpensive
© 1981 by Richard W. Sherwood
* A.B., 1977, University of California, Davis; J.D., 1980, University of Utah
College of Law. Member of the California Bar.
1. FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
2. United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958), quoted in
Chronicle Publishing Co. v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. 2d 548, 572, 354 P.2d 637, 650, 7
Cal. Rptr. 109, 122 (1960). See generally W. GLASER, PRETRIAL DISCOVERY AND THE
ADVERSARY SYSTEM 9-12 (1968); Cutner, Discovery-Civil Litigation's Fading Light:
A Lawyer Looks at the Federal Discovery Rules After Forty Years of Use, 52 TEMP.
L.Q. 933, 933-37 (1979).
3. Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 2d 355, 376, 364 P.2d 266, 275, 15
Cal. Rptr. 90, 99 (1961) (quoting Chronicle Publishing Co. v. Superior Court, 54 Cal.
2d 548, 561, 354 P.2d 637, 643, 7 Cal. Rptr. 109, 115 (1960)). See also United States v.
Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495,
500-01, 507 (1947).
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way, facts which otherwise could not be proved except
with great difficulty; (4) to educate the parties in advance
of trial as to the real value of their claims and defenses,
thereby encouraging settlements; (5) to expedite litiga-
tion; (6) to safeguard against surprise; (7) to prevent de-
lay; (8) to simplify and narrow the issues; and, (9) to ex-
pedite and facilitate both preparation and trial.'
To achieve these objectives, discovery has purposefully
been given a broad scope. Under the Federal Rules, any mat-
ter not privileged may be discovered as long as it is relevant to
the subject matter involved in the pending action.5 It need not
be related to specific issues which have been pleaded. Even if
the information sought will be inadmissible at trial, discovery
is allowable provided that the information is reasonably calcu-
lated to lead to admissible evidence. This same broad
scope-relevancy to the subject matter-was also adopted by
the California Code of Civil Procedure.
Whenever rules are written without clear parameters, the
possibility of misuse is enhanced, and this possibility has be-
come reality in the area of discovery. Parties and attorneys
alike have used discovery techniques to further their own liti-
gative position, thereby abrogating discovery's original pur-
poses of inexpensive and efficient litigation. Abuse of discov-
ery-the use of discovery devices for purposes not intended
by the drafters or the courts-is prevalent.8 One judge has
stated that: "My experience as a participant in and observer
of civil litigation has convinced me that abuse of the judicial
4. Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 2d 355, 376, 364 P.2d 266, 275, 15
Cal. Rptr. 90, 99 (1961).
5. "Relevant to the subject matter" has been broadly construed to include any
matter that bears or could reasonably bear on any issue in the suit. This construction
also encompasses issues which do not necessarily bear on the merits of the case such
as jurisdiction and venue. See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 350-
52 & n.13 (1978). See also Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 500-01 (1947).
6. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
7. See generally CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 2016(b), 2030(c), 2031(a) (West Supp.
1981).
8. A recent empirical study conducted by the Federal Judicial Center casts
doubt upon this thesis. Although the focus of the study was not discovery abuse per
se, the authors did make the following observation: "The data do suggest, however,
that discovery abuse, to the extent it exists, does not permeate the vast majority of
federal filings." P. CONNOLLY, E. HOLLEMAN & M. KUHLMAN, JUDICIAL CONTROLS AND
THE CIVIL LrnGATIVE PROCESS: DISCOVERY 35 (1978). For a discussion of this study
and a claim that discovery abuse is exaggerated see Schroeder & Frank, The Pro-
posed Changes in the Discovery Rules, 1978 ARIz. ST. L.J. 475, 476-78.
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process, while difficult to detect and prove, is widespread."
Through its liberal interpretation of discovery rules, Cali-
fornia has inadvertently encouraged excessive use of discovery
devices. Parties are permitted to employ discovery devices
even though there is little possibility that usable information
will be obtained.1" This policy encourages unjustified discov-
ery techniques. 1
With litigation costs skyrocketing, parties and attorneys
can use excessive discovery devices to bankrupt the opposition
or prolong the action."3 Discovery answers often require an in-
ordinate expenditure of time. Excessive requests for discovery
force the opposition to spend money it may not possess. Some
parties fail to answer discovery requests for the express pur-
pose of delaying the case, thereby multiplying the costs of the
suit. The upshot of these tactics is that well-heeled parties
can coerce impecunious parties into settling or dismissing
their claims solely because they lack the funds needed to pros-
ecute or defend the case. 3 As one judge stated:
I know full well as do most attorneys that discovery is
often used vexatiously in an effort to obtain a settlement.
9. Renfrew, Discovery Sanctions: A Judicial Perspective, 67 C AiF. L. REV. 264,
264 (1979). In SCM Societa Commerciale, S.P.A. v. Industrial & Commercial Re-
search Corp., 72 F.R.D. 110 (N.D. Tex. 1976), Judge Porter, in venting his frustration
over the intransigence of both parties to participate in the discovery process, made
the following remark:
Once again this court has been called in to arbitrate the no show and no
tell discovery games engaged in by the parties to this lawsuit. I should
emphasize at the outset that this is not the only game in town. The fact
pattern hereinafter recited has repeatedly surfaced in other litigation
during my tenure on the bench. In fact, I have often thought that if the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were in effect in 1492 the Indians un-
doubtedly would have made a motion to suppress Columbus' discovery.
Id. at 111.
10. The California court has remarked:
Inasmuch as discovery of all relevant material during the time of prepa-
ration is the aim of the statute, and since the statute intends that each
party shall divulge, within limits, the information in his possession,
there is nothing improper about a fishing expedition, per se.
Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 2d 355, 384, 364 P.2d 266, 280, 15 Cal.
Rptr. 90, 104 (1961).
11. See Renfrew, supra note 9, at 266.
12. Spiraling costs, generated to a large extent by abusive discovery tactics, has
evoked much concern among legal practitioners. See Smith, The Concern Over Dis-
covery, 28 DRAKE L. REV. 51, 59 (1978-1979), reprinted in 30 FED. INS. COUNSEL Q.
143 (1980).
13. See generally W. GLASER, supra note 2, at 12; McKinstry, Civil Discovery
Reform, 14 FORUM 790, 795 (1979); Renfrew, supra note 9, at 267.
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The case is settled in such instances for 'nuisance value'
and not on the relative strength of the legal rights and
liabilities."
In addition to using discovery to prolong litigation, par-
ties can conceal requested information by disclosing vast
amounts of information that was not requested.1 This prac-
tice compels the requesting party to examine all documents
and information disclosed to obtain the needed documents or
information. "While our discovery laws were designed to pre-
vent trial by ambush, the most common cry from lawyers is
that they are being 'papered to death'."16 The primary pur-
pose for discovery, to obtain relevant information, is thus un-
dermined. The very procedures which were developed to assist
lawyers in obtaining truthful information are being used to
thwart this objective.1
One reason for the proliferation of unethical discovery
tactics is the self-policing nature of discovery. The trial judge
becomes involved in the discovery process only when one
party seeks a protective order, motion to compel response,
sanction, etc. An attorney can inundate the opposition with
frivolous and vexatious discovery requests unless and until the
opposition seeks the protection of the court.18 Even if protec-
tive orders are finally sought, the delay may be sufficient to
make it profitable for the party involved. This dilemma would
14. SCM Societa Commerciale S.P.A. v. Industrial & Commercial Research
Corp., 72 F.R.D. 110, 113 (N.D. Tex. 1976) (citation omitted).
15. FED. R. Civ. P. 34 outlines what may be requested of another party for in-
spection and copying purposes. Unfortunately, as noted by the American Bar Associ-
ation, "[ilt is apparently not rare for parties deliberately to mix critical documents
with others in the hope of obscuring significance." Section of Litigation, American
Bar Association, Report of the Special Committee for the Study of Discovery Abuse
22 (1977) [hereinafter cited as ABA Discovery Abuse Report]. This practice has led
to an amendment to FED. R. Civ. P. 34(b) by the Supreme Court. For a discussion of
this development, see note 111 infra.
16. Deyo v. Kilbourne, 84 Cal. App. 3d 771, 781, 149 Cal. Rptr. 499, 508 (1978).
17. See SCM Societe Commerciale S.P.A. v. Industrial & Commercial Research
Corp., 72 F.R.D. 110 (N.D. Tex. 1976), where the court stated:
The effect of these vexatious discovery tactics has been to substantially
hamper the speedy, just and efficient determination of legal disputes in
the federal courts. These kinds of practices cost litigants large amounts
of money with the collateral effect of tilting the scales of justice in the
direction of the party that can best afford to pay.
Id. at 112.
18. See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 357 n.24 (1978). See,
also Cohn, Federal Discovery: A Survey of Local Rules and Practices in View of
Proposed Changes to the Federal Rules, 63 MINN. L. REv. 253, 254 (1979).
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not exist if the trial judge supervised discovery from its incep-
tion. Improprieties could be dealt with immediately, thereby
lessening the likelihood of delay.
Sanctions are available against parties who use discovery
devices excessively without justification or who fail to comply
with discovery requests. 9 However, the courts have been re-
luctant to fully invoke them.'0 Appellate courts have exhibited
an intense aversion to severe sanctions such as dismissal,
often reversing trial judges when they believe that sanctions
have been improperly employed.' 1 Because of this articulated
policy, trial judges have been disinclined to impose sanctions
except in exceptional cases."
Misuse of discovery, whether it be excessive use of discov-
ery devices or failure to comply with discovery requests, has
been a subject of concern to both the Bar and the Bench.28
Chief Justice Burger has asserted that to prevent abuse in dis-
covery, the trial courts must exercise their authority. 24 Sug-
gestions to limit the scope of discovery and strengthen the au-
thority of federal courts to impose sanctions were adopted as
proposed amendments to the Federal Rules.' 6 Some commen-
tators criticized these amendments for unduly limiting the
scope of discovery.' Others argued that structural changes
19. E.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c), 37; CAL. Civ. PROC. CoDE §§ 2019(b)(1), 2034
(West Supp. 1981).
20. See generally Werner, Survery of Discovery Sanctions, 1979 ARiz. ST. L.J.
299, 302, 317.
21. See Renfrew, supra note 9, at 276. o
22. As one commentator has written: Those rare occasions on which sanctions
are imposed show a pattern of long term patience and permissiveness through viola-
tion after violation before any action is taken, and then the action is virtually never
directed to the involved attorney. Cutner, supra note 2, at 955.
23. The Supreme Court recently expressed its concern about discovery abuse.
"There have been repeated expressions of concern about undue and uncontrolled dis-
covery, and voices from this Court have joined the chorus." Herbert v. Lando, 441
U.S. 153, 176 (1979). In a concurring opinion, Justice Powell expressed his concern
over discovery tactics which increase delay and expense in civil litigation. Id. at 179(Powell, J., concurring). See generally Kennelly, Pretrial Discovery-The Courts and
Trial Lawyers Are Finally Discovering That Too Much of It Can be Counterproduc-
tive, 1977 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 458.
24. Pollack, Discovery-Its Abuse and Correction, 80 F.R.D. 219, 223 (1979).
25. Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Judicial Conference of the
United States, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 77 F.R.D. 613 (1978) [hereinafter cited as 1978 Proposed
Amendments].
26. See, e.g., Becker, Modern Discovery: Promoting Efficient Use and Prevent-
ing Abuse of Discovery in the Roscoe Pound Tradition, 78 F.R.D. 267 (1978).
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were not needed, but that increased judicial oversight was de-
sirable.27 After the Bar commented on the proposed amend-
ments, they were substantially revised.2 8 The revisions were
recently adopted by the Supreme Court, effective August 1,
1980.29 As adopted, the only modification regarding discovery
sanctions is availability of sanctions when a party or attorney
fails to obey a court order under the new discovery conference
procedure.3 0
Aside from structural changes in the Federal Rules, dis-
covery improprieties may be limited by local rules enacted
under the authority of rule 83.31 Courts may also impose costs
on attorneys under other statutory authority.3 2
This article examines the requirements for imposing
sanctions under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the
California Code of Civil Procedure. Although federal courts
have traditionally been reluctant to employ sanctions,33 a new
trend has been emerging since the Supreme Court validated
the use of sanctions for deterrent as well as remedial pur-
poses.34 This trend will be examined as will the new amend-
ments to the Federal Rules. Rule 37 is the primary authority
27. See, e.g., Pollack, supra note 24, at 227; Shapiro, Some Problems of Discov-
ery in an Adversary System, 63 MINN. L. REv. 1055, 1057 (1979).
28. Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Judicial Conference of the
United States, Revised Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 80 F.R.D. 323 (1979) [hereinafer cited as 1979 Proposed
Amendments].
29. Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 85 F.R.D. 521 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as 1980 Amendments], reprinted in 100 S. Ct. Adv. Sh. No. 16,
(1980).
30. See 1980 Amendments, supra note 29, at rules 37(b)(2),(g), 26(f), at 526,
532-33, reprinted in 100 S. Ct. Adv. Sh. No. 16, at 6, 12-14. For a discussion of the
new amendments affecting discovery, see text accompanying notes 103-18 infra.
31. See generally Cohn, supra note 18.
32. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1976). A court may also dismiss a plaintiff for failure to
prosecute, to comply with any order of court, or to comply with the Federal Rules.
FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b).
33. See Renfrew, supra note 9, at 271; Werner, supra note 20, at 302; Note, The
Emerging Deterrence Orientation in the Imposition of Discovery Sanctions, 91
HARV. L. REv. 1033, 1038 (1978).
34. National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639
(1976) (per curiam). Some commentators contend however, that this trend may be
more illusory than real, noting that even after National Hockey League "trial judges
continue to be reluctant to impose sanctions except for flagrant violations of discov-
ery orders and reviewing courts continue to reverse a substantial portion of cases
where discovery sanctions have been imposed." Epstein, Corcoran, Krieger & Carr,
An Up-Date on Rule 37 Sanctions After National Hockey League v. Metropolitan
Hockey Club, Inc., 84 F.R.D. 145, 147 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Epstein].
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for imposing sanctions in the federal courts. Alternative bases
for sanctions, local rules, 28 U.S.C. § 1927, and "inherent au-
thority" will also be discussed.
Section 2034 is the primary authority for discovery sanc-
tions under the California Code of Civil Procedure. An impor-
tant element of these sanctions is California's liberal policy
that discovery be presumptively permitted; only in rare cases
will it be denied. California's sanctions will be compared
against sanctions under the Federal Rules, and their dissimi-
larities will be examined in detail.
II. SANCTIONS UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES
Rule 3785 operates when a party fails to comply with a
discovery request or makes an objection to that request. It
was the intent of the drafters that this rule would only be in-
voked where there were otherwise unresolvable disputes. At-
torneys representing the parties involved must first attempt
to resolve disputes outside of court."6 Then, where good cause
is shown, a party may move the court for a protective order
against oppressive discovery requests or requests for discovery
in privileged areas.87 If a party objects to discovery but does
not move for a protective order, the party seeking discovery
can move to compel discovery under rule 37(a).
35. Before undertaking an examination of rule 37, it is important to remember
that most trial court decisions imposing sanctions are interlocutory and therefore not
appealable. The federal courts usually require that a decision be final before it is
appealable. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976). Interlocutory decisions can generally only be ap-
pealed if an order granting or refusing an injunction is involved. Id. § 1292. If a con-
trolling question of law is involved, however, the trial judge may certify the issue for
immediate appeal and the court of appeals in its discretion may permit an appeal. Id.
§ 1292(b).
Appellate courts may also issue writs of mandamus or prohibition in order to
review a trial court discovery decision, although this is rare. All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. §
1651 (1976). See, e.g., Evanson v. Union Oil Co. of Calif., 619 F.2d 72 (Emer. Ct.
App., cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 102 (1980)) (writs of mandamus and prohibition would
not lie to overturn sanctions imposed by trial court when none of the. trial court's
actions constituted a usurpation of power or a clear abuse of discretion).
Discovery issues may also be appealed through operation of FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b)
which permits the trial court to enter a final judgment if multiple claims or multiple
parties are present. See generally Perlman, The Federal Discovery Rules: A Look at
New Proposals, 15 NEw ENG. L. REv. 57, 71 n.85 (1979); Shapiro, supra note 27, at
1056 & n.85.
36. See Cohn, supra note 18.
37. See FED. R. Cv. P. 26(c). The court may impose expenses in relation to this
motion. Id. at rule 37(a)(4).
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A. A Survey of Rule 37 Sanctions
Under rule 37(a) a party may apply for an order compel-
ling discovery when the opposition fails to answer a question
propounded in a deposition, fails to answer an interrogatory,
or fails to permit inspections as requested. An evasive or in-
complete answer is deemed a failure to answer. Before the
1970 amendments to the Federal Rules, rule 37 could not be
invoked unless a party "refused" to comply with a discovery
request. This language created confusion among the courts as
to whether or not "refusal" required a showing of
willfulness.3
The Supreme Court resolved this dispute in Societe In-
ternationale Pour Participations Industrielles Et Commerci-
ales, S.A. v. Rogers, 9 holding that a party "refuses" to obey
an order under rule 37(b)(2) by simply failing to comply with
it. The Court found that willfulness or good faith did not af-
fect noncompliance, but was only relevant to the specific sanc-
tions which the court might impose. 40 To remove doubt about
the meaning of "refusal" and to comport with the decisison in
Societe Internationale, rule 37(a) was amended to include
any "failure" to answer a discovery request.41 All failures to
comply with a discovery request, including objections and eva-
sive answers, are now subject to this provision."2
If the motion to compel discovery is granted, the court is
required to assess reasonable expenses, including attorney's
fees, against the noncomplying party, deponent, or attorney
unless the court finds that opposing the motion was substan-
tially justified. 3 If the motion is denied, the same standard is
38. See, e.g., Campbell v. Johnson, 101 F. Supp. 705 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); Roth v.
Paramount Pictures Distrib. Corp., 8 F.R.D. 31 (W.D. Pa. 1948).
39. 357 U.S. 197, 208 (1958).
40. Id.
41. Judicial Conference of the United States, Advisory Committee's Explana-
tory Statement Concerning Amendments of the Discovery Rules, 48 F.R.D. 487, 538
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Advisory Committee's Statement]. For a general discus-
sion of the 1970 amendments see Note, Clarifying the Scope of Civil Discovery
Under the Federal Rules: The Proposed Amendments, 44 NOTRE DAME LAW. 81
(1968).
42. Even negligent failures may be sanctioned. See Marquis v. Chrysler Corp.,
577 F.2d 624, 642 (9th Cir. 1978).
43. The party moving the court has the burden of proof in showing that the
materials or information sought is discoverable. See, e.g., Barnett v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 80 F.R.D. 662 (W.D. Okla. 1978) (court overruled motion to compel answers to
interrogatories holding that plaintiff failed to prove that the information sought justi-
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used to determine whether or not the party or attorney bring-
ing the motion should be assessed expenses. 4' This provision
is thus designed to award expenses when a party or attorney
opposed a motion or made a motion to compel without sub-
stantial justification. Its purpose is to deter parties and attor-
neys from bringing frivolous discovery requests or objections
before the court.'5
Although awarding expenses and fees was conceived to be
the most important sanction in deterring parties from seeking
unnecessary motions to compel, it has been rarely used."' A
poll of federal judges taken just two years after the 1970
amendments became effective revealed that seventy-seven
percent of the responding judges had not awarded expenses
more frequently than under the prior provisions. 7
Ohio v. Crofters, Inc.'8 is a case which departs from the
norm. The trial court awarded expenses and attorney's fees of
$59,949 against the defendant Anderson for its failure to pro-
duce documents that plaintiff had requested. The court in-
cluded costs associated with opposing defendant's appeals and
petitions before the court of appeals and the Supreme Court,
finding that these expenses were incurred in pursuing plain-
tiff's discovery rights. Applying rules 37(a) and (b), the court
found that Anderson had withheld documents to which the
plaintiff was entitled and had willfully violated court produc-
tion orders.' 9
In SCM Societa Commercial S.P.A. v. Industrial and
fled the burden imposed upon the defendant); Brame v. Ray Bills Fin. Corp., 76
F.R.D. 25 (N.D.N.Y. 1977) (court overruled motion to compel answers to interro-
gatories finding that the information sought was not discoverable); Lafond v. Gray, 62
F.R.D. 446, 448 (E.D. Wis. 1974) (court denied motion to compel for failure of moving
party to meet his burden because he failed to properly present his arguments before
the court). The trial court has a great deal of discretion in deciding what orders, if
any, to make as well as deciding if sanctions are to be imposed. See generally C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, 8 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2284, at 769-72 (1970).
But see § 2284 id. (Supp. 1980).
44. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4).
45. Advisory Committee's Statement, supra note 41, at 540.
46. C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 43, § 2288, at 786 (1970). See also
Werner supra note 20, at 309; Comment, Sanctions Imposed by Courts on Attorneys
Who Abuse the Judicial Process, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 619, 633 (1977).
47. Federal Discovery Rules: Effects of the 1970 Amendments, 8 COLUM. J.L. &
Soc. PROB. 623, 643 (1972).
48. 75 F.R.D. 12 (D. Colo. 1977), aff'd sub nom. Ohio v. Arthur Anderson & Co.,
570 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 833 (1978).
49. 75 F.R.D. at 21-23.
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Commercial Research Corp.50 the judge imposed monetary
sanctions for failure of a party to comply with a court order to
answer interrogatories, and aggressively gave notice to all at-
torneys in that jurisdiction that unreasonable opposition to
discovery requests would not be tolerated. He stated that par-
ties behaving in this manner would be assessed expenses
under rule 37(a) unless their opposition was substantially
justified.5
If a deponent fails to be sworn in or answer a question
after being directed to do so by the court, then this may be
treated as contempt of court under rule 37(b). Additionally, if
a person or party fails to obey an order,52 including a rule
37(a) order, to provide or permit discovery, then the courts
may: a) order that the matters discussed in the initial order be
established for the purposes of the current action; b) order the
disobedient party not to support or oppose designated claims;
c) order that pleadings be stricken, dismiss the action or
render a judgment by default; or (d) treat as contempt of
court any failure to obey court orders. In lieu of or in addition
to the preceding orders, the court may also require the party
failing to obey the orders or his attorney to pay reasonable
expenses, including attorney's fees.
It should be noted that, similar to rule 37(a), subsection
(b) uses the term "failure," not "refusal"; thus, no showing of
willfulness is required to apply sanctions under subsection
(b)." Although willfulness is not generally required to impose
sanctions, dismissal and default do require a greater showing.
The Supreme Court in Societe Internationale was concerned
that dismissing an action without affording a party an oppor-
50. 72 F.R.D. 110 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
51. Id. at 112 n.3. See also Marquis v. Chrysler Corp., 577 F.2d 624 (9th Cir.
1978) (court ordered Chrysler to pay $2,000 to plaintiff's attorney as compensation
incurred by plaintiff's attorney in bringing a rule 37(a) motion to compel production
of documents).
52. Rule 37(b) sanctions cannot be imposed unless a court order has been en-
tered. See, e.g., EEOC v. Carter Carburetor, Div. of ACF Indus., Inc., 577 F.2d 43
(8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1081 (1979) (appellate court reversed sanctions
imposed by trial court finding that defendant had failed to move for further answers
to interrogatories rendering the procedures used to bestow the sanctions highly sus-
pect); Britt v. Corporacion Peruana De Vapores, 506 F.2d 927, 932 (5th Cir. 1975)
(court upheld refusal of trial court to levy sanctions citing the fact that plaintiff
failed to obtain a court order).
53. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b).
54. See Flaks v. Koegel, 504 F.2d 702, 708-09 (2d Cir. 1974).
576 [Vol. 21
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tunity for a hearing on the merits of his case could violate
fifth amendment due process guarantees.5 5 In order to prevent
due process violations, the Court held that: "Rule 37 should
not be construed to authorize dismissal of this complaint be-
cause of petitioner's noncompliance with a pretrial production
order when it has been established that failure to comply has
been due to inability, and not to willfulness, bad faith, or any
fault of petitioner."" Thus, "willfulness, bad faith, or fault"
must be shown to employ dismissal, but any "failure" is suffi-
cient to impose less drastic sanctions.57
Courts have been reluctant to impose the most drastic
sanction, dismissal with prejudice.58 Although appellate courts
frequently reverse sanctions which are outcome determina-
tive,59 recent decisions indicate that this pervasive attitude
may be changing.6 This changing trend is primarily due to
55. 357 U.S. at 209-10. See Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U.S. 322
(1909) (court held that a state court could strike the answer and render a default
judgment against the defendant who refused to produce documents in accordance
with a pretrial order, noting that such action was not applied as a punishment, but
was applied under a presumption that refusal to produce evidence was an admission
that the asserted defense lacked merit); Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409 (1897) (court
held that due process was denied a defendant whose answer was struck since it lead
to a pro confesso decree without a hearing on the merits; defendant had refused to
obey a court order pertinent to the suit). See generally Note, Standards for Imposi-
tion of Discovery Sanctions, 27 ME. L. REV. 247 (1975).
56. 357 U.S. at 212.
57. See Stanziale v. First Nat'l City Bank, 74 F.R.D. 557, 559 n.2 (S.D.N.Y.
1977). The second circuit held that "fault" as required by Societe Internationale for
the imposition of dismissal encompasses gross negligence. In this case, the court
found that counsel's failure to cure deficiencies in interrogatories was gross negli-
gence, that the trial court could properly order the preclusion of this evidence, and
that because of the importance of this evidence, its preclusion was tantamount to a
dismissal under rule 37. Cine Forty-Second St. Theatre Corp. v. Allied Artists Pic-
tures Corp., 602 F.2d 1062 (2d Cir. 1979). For an analysis of this decision see Note,
Civil Procedure: Discovery Sanctions 53 TEMP. L.Q. 140 (1980).
58. See generally Werner, supra note 20, at 317.
59. See, e.g., Wilson v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 561 F.2d 494 (4th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1020 (1978) (appellate court overturned sanction of dis-
missal imposed by the trial court for defendant's failure to produce documents as
ordered by the court even though the trial court had found defendant's action to be
willful).
60. E.g., Laclede Gas Co. v. G.W. Warnecke Corp., 604 F.2d 561, 566 (8th Cir.
1979) (court of appeals upheld dismissal of defendant's counterclaim for willful fail-
ure of defendant to adequately and timely answer plaintiffs interrogatories as or-
dered by the trial court); Dependahl v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 84 F.R.D. 416 (E.D.
Mo. 1979) (trial court struck defendant's affirmative defenses and counterclaims for
bad faith and willful refusal of defendant to completely answer interrogatories as or-
dered by the court).
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the Supreme Court's holding in National Hockey League v.
Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc.61 that dismissal must be
available as a sanction, not only to penalize those whose con-
duct warrants such action, but also as a deterrent against
those who might be tempted to use similar tactics.2
Some courts have precluded parties from introducing evi-
dence at trial for failure to comply with discovery orders. In
Riverside Memorial Mausoleum, Inc. v. Sonnenblick-
Goldman Corp.6" the judge precluded plaintiffs from offering
any evidence related to certain interrogatories served by de-
fendants. Notwithstanding a court order to promptly answer,
plaintiffs' answers were late and insufficient. Similarly, in
Ohio v. Crofters, Inc.e4 the district court held that in light of
the defendant's continued failure to produce documents that
had been ordered, defendant would be precluded from using
these documents at trial.
While courts do not assess expenses under rule 37(a) as a
matter of course, they are more willing to employ them when
a party fails to comply with a court order under rule 37(b)(2).
For example, in Stanziale v. First National City Bank," the
court refused to dismiss plaintiff's action under rule 37(b) for
failure to answer interrogatories, but did assess expenses
against the plaintiff because there was no substantial justifica-
tion for his conduct. In Surg-O-Flex of America, Inc. v. Ber-
gen Brunswig Co.,66 plaintiff failed to comply with an order to
ahswer interrogatories and produce documents. Plaintiff's
counsel rationalized this failure by claiming he was unfamiliar
61. 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976) (per curiam).
62. See text and accompanying notes 85-102 infra.
63. 80 F.R.D. 433 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
64. 75 F.R.D. 12, 25 (D. Colo. 1977), aff'd sub nor. Ohio v. Arthur Anderson &
Co., 570 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 833 (1978). See also United
States v. Sumitomo Marine & Fire Ins. Co., 617 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1980) (court
upheld trial court's sanction of precluding the government from introducing evidence
of its damages since the government had willfully disregarded the court's order to
produce this information to the defendant); Cine Forty-Second St. Theatre Corp. v.
Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 602 F.2d 1062 (2d Cir. 1979) (court ordered plaintiff
precluded from offering evidence as to damages for failure to answer defendant's in-
terrogatories; this preclusion was tantamount to a dismissal since damages were a
required element of the cause of action).
65. 74 F.R.D. 557 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
66. 76 F.R.D. 654 (D. Conn. 1977). See also David v. Hooker, Ltd., 560 F.2d 412
(9th Cir. 1977); Black Panther Party v. Levi, 483 F. Supp. 251 (D.D.C. 1980);
Dependahl v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 84 F.R.D. 752 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Goodsons & Co.
v. National American Corp., 78 F.R.D. 721 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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with the Federal Rules, even though he had been a member of
the Bar for twenty-two years. Exercising its discretion, the
court declined to order dismissal, but did award $1,335 in at-
torney's fees to the defendant.
An important issue under rule 37(b)(2) is whether attor-
neys should be assessed expenses as provided by the rule, or
whether a client should be held responsible for the attorney's
actions. In Link v. Wabash Railroad 7 the Supreme Court up-
held dismissal of plaintiff's action for failure to prosecute
when counsel failed to appear at a pretrial conference. The
client argued that this imposed an unjust burden on him, but
the Court stated: "Petitioner voluntarily chose this attorney
as his representative in the action, and he cannot now avoid
the consequences of the acts or omissions of this freely se-
lected agent.""8
Whether or not it is equitable to impute the sins of the
attorney to the client in all circumstances is questionable. One
judge has asserted that it is equitable, arguing that the client
is more responsible, and that a malpractice action against the
attorney is the client's remedy." However, this solution may
be unrealistic because some clients will not recognize that
their attorney was responsible for dismissal of the suit, while
others will not be able to bear the expense of initiating a mal-
practice suit. If the client does little more than hand the case
over to the attorney, it is unjust to hold the client accountable
for the attorney's derelictions.7 Additionally, monetary sanc-
tions would have more impact if attorneys knew they would
be held personally accountable for failure to obey court
orders.
In Associated Radio Service Co. v. Page Airways, Inc.'71
67. 370 U.S. 626 (1962). See generally Renfrew, supra note 9, at 273-74; Wer-
ner, supra note 20, at 325-28; Comment, supra note 46, at 629-33.
68. 370 U.S at 633. See also Cine Forty-Second St. Theatre Corp. v. Allied Art-
ists Picture Corp., 602 F.2d 1062 (2d Cir. 1979) (dismissal for attorney's gross profes-
sional negligence; litigant chooses counsel at his own risk).
69. Renfrew, supra note 9, at 273-74.
70. See Werner, supra note 20, at 326. See also Marshall v. Segona, 621 F.2d
763 (5th Cir. 1980), where the trial court granted an order to dismiss with prejudice
the suit filed by the Secretary of Labor for answering interrogatories four days late.
The court of appeals reversed, stating that "[d]ismissal is generally inappropriate and
lesser sanctions are favored Where neglect is plainly attributable to an attorney rather
than to his blameless client." Id. at 768.
71. 73 F.R.D. 633 (N.D. Tex. 1977). See also In re Sutter, 543 F.2d 1030 (2d
Cir. 1976)(costs assessed against attorney for failure to prosecute under local rule
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Judge Porter instituted a novel solution to this dilemma. The
attorneys involved on both sides of this antitrust action failed
to comply with court orders directing them to hold a discov-
ery conference to resolve their differences, and to file a joint
conference report. The judge found that failure to produce the
report was the fault of the attorneys, not the parties involved.
The judge therefore ordered plaintiffs' attorneys to pay defen-
dants' costs in preparing and attending the hearing, and de-
fendants' attorneys were similarly ordered to pay plaintiffs'
costs. To ensure that the attorneys felt the brunt of this sanc-
tion, the law firms were ordered to receive no compensation
from their clients for this assessment.
Even when attorneys are ordered by a court to pay mone-
tary sanctions, it is a difficult sanction for a court to enforce
because many attorneys will seek indemnification from their
clients. The Supreme Court however, has recently reaffirmed
its support for rule 37(b) sanctions, emphasizing that counsel
as well as parties may be held personally liable for expenses
and attorney's fees if they fail to comply with court orders.7 2
In United States v. Sumitomo Marine & Fire Insurance
Co., 73 the court of appeals upheld the imposition of a personal
$500 sanction against the government attorney for failure to
answer interrogatories. The court held that this sanction was
within the discretion of the trial court. Other courts have also
imposed costs and attorney's fees against attorneys for failure
to obey court orders.7 4 Orders imposing costs against both cli-
which imposed costs on attorney for failing to proceed at trial on the date set).
72. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 100 S. Ct. 2455, 2462 (1980).
73. 617 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1980). It should be noted that attorney's fees cannot
customarily be awarded against the United States in the form of sanctions. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2412 (1976). This is the reason for the imposition of fees by the court against the
government attorney personally.
74. Dorey v. Dorey, 609 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir. 1980) (costs and attorney's fees
imposed against counsel and client for failure to answer interrogatories); Independent
Investor Protective League v. Touche Ross & Co., 607'F.2d 530 (2d Cir. 1978) (client
and counsel ordered to pay defendant's expenses in bringing motion for sanctions
because of failure to comply with order requiring that interrogatories be answered);
Barker v. Bledsoe, 85 F.R.D. 545 (W.D. Okla. 1979) (costs and attorney's fees levied
against counsel personally for failure to answer interrogatories, failure to appear at
pretrial conference and concealment of information); Chesa Int'l Ltd. v. Fashion As-
soc., Inc., 425 F. Supp. 234 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 573 F.2d 1288 (2d Cir. 1977) (attorney
held to be jointly and severally liable for expenses imposed for failure to comply with
discovery order since he contributed significantly to the delay). Courts do not always
impose expenses on attorneys, however, as noted by some commentators: "Although
Courts seem happier in imposing sanctions where there is an indication that the cli-
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ent and counsel, however, are frequently ambiguous regarding
the apportionment of the sanction."
Some parties have attempted to secure discovery delay
and prevent sanctions from being imposed by complying with
the court order just prior to the hearing on the motion for
sanctions. In most instances, this tactic has not been success-
ful. Defendants in Perry v. Golub7 6 failed to obey a request for
production of documents, forcing the plaintiff to file a motion
to compel. After the motion to compel was granted, defen-
dants sought a protective order and still refused to produce
the ordered documents. Sanctions were then sought by the
plaintiff under rule 37(b). At the hearing, defendants ex-
pressed a willingness to produce some of the documents, but
the court found that this belated offer did not justify a lesser
sanction. The court dismissed a petition which the defendants
had filed in the case.
In G-K Properties v. Redevelopment Agency of San
Jose," a motion for sanctions was brought because plaintiff
failed to produce documents that the court ordered. The trial
court refused to accept a tender of the documents at the hear-
ing, noting that a late acceptance would encourage litigants to
withhold vital information. The trial court's action was ap-
proved by the appellate court which found that the last-min-
ute tender could not cure the problems that the plaintiff had
created; dismissal with prejudice as levied by the trial court
was upheld.7 8
As outlined by rule 37(c), if a party fails to admit the gen-
ent participated in the dilatory tactics, they have on occasion visited the fault of
negligent attorneys upon innocent clients." Epstein, supra note 34, at 172.
75. See generally Epstein, supra note 34, at 173.
76. 74 F.R.D. 360 (N.D. Ala. 1976).
77. 577 F.2d 645 (9th Cir. 1978). In Cine Forty-Second St. Theatre Corp. v.
Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 602 F.2d 1062, 1068 (2d Cir. 1979), the court found that
belated compliance with orders should not be given great weight stating: "Any other
conclusion would encourage dilatory tactics, and compliance with discovery orders
would come only when the backs of counsel and the litigants were against the wall."
See also Ohio v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 570 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir. 1978); David v.
Hooker, Ltd., 560 F.2d 412 (9th Cir. 1977).
78. In some instances, however, courts have been lenient with belated compli-
ance attempts. See, e.g., Vac-Air, Inc. v. John Mohr &'Sons, Inc., 471 F.2d 231 (7th
Cir. 1973) (default for failure to answer interrogatories was too severe when answers
were subsequently filed one month after they were due); Kozlowski v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 73 F.R.D. 73 (D. Mass. 1976) (conditional default judgment entered for failure
to comply with court order to produce documents, but court said default would be
removed if defendant subseqently complied).
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uineness of any document or the truth of any matter re-
quested under rule 36, and the requesting party then proves
the genuineness of the document or the truth of the matter,"
that party can apply for a court order requiring the other side
to pay the reasonable expenses incurred in making such
proof.80 Before the 1970 amendments, this subsection applied
only to sworn denials. By stating an inability to admit or
deny, a party could thus circumvent this sanction. The pre-
sent language contains the term "failure", which encompasses
all failures to admit, including an inability to admit or deny.81
Now a party need not make a sworn denial before the rule
37(c) sanction can be imposed.
Under rule 37(d), the court is given broad authority to
order discovery. If a party or person fails to appear for a dep-
osition after being served with notice, or to serve answers or
objections to interrogatories, or to serve a written response to
a request for inspection, the court may make such orders as it
regards as just, including actions authorized under rule
37(b)(2)(A)-(C). The party failing to act or his attorney will
also be required to pay the reasonable expenses, including at-
torney's fees, unless the court finds that the failure was sub-
stantially justified or that other circumstances make the
award of expenses unjust. A failure to act cannot be excused
on the ground that the discovery sought is objectionable, un-
less the party has applied for a protective order under rule
26(c).
The 1970 amendments eliminated the requirement of
"willfulness" which previously existed in rule 37(d); now lesser
sanctions can be applied for a mere failure to comply.2 How-
ever, where dismissal is imposed, due process requires that
79. The party seeking expenses must prove the truth of the matter requested at
trial by a preponderance of the evidence. 4A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 37.04 (2d
ed. 1980).
80. The court is required to make the order unless it finds:
1) the request was held objectionable pursuant to Rule 36(a), or 2) the
admission sought was of no substantial importance, or 3) the party fail-
ing to admit had reasonable ground to believe that he might prevail on
the matter, or 4) there was other good reason for the failure to admit.
FED. R. Civ. P. 37(c).
81. Advisory Committee's Statement, supra note 41, at 541; C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, supra note 43, § 2290, at 801-02 (1970).
82. Advisory Committee's Statement, supra note 41, at 541-42; C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, supra note 43, § 2291, at 811-12 (1970).
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"willfulness, bad faith or fault" be shown. 3
Courts have imposed dismissal under subsection (d), al-
though the language of the rule leaves discretion to the trial
judge to determine what sanction should be imposed. In An-
derson v. Air West, Inc.8 4 plaintiff brought a shareholder ac-
tion against Howard Hughes for alleged securities violations.
Hughes was ordered to appear for a deposition, but he failed
to do so. The plaintiff then moved for sanctions under rule
37(d). In imposing a default judgment, the court found that
Hughes' failure to appear was due to his bad faith and willful
disregard of the judicial process.
B. Sanctions Since National Hockey League
National Hockey League"8 grew out of a massive anti-
trust suit concerning professional hockey. Defendant had
served interrogatories on one of the plaintiffs, who then re-
quested and received numerous extensions. The district court
finally ordered the plaintiff to answer the interrogatories. Sev-
enteen months later, the plaintiff still had not given meaning-
ful answers. The court felt this inaction constituted flagrant
bad faith, and dismissed plaintiff's case. "If the sanction of
dismissal is not warranted by the circumstances of this case,
then the Court can envisage no set of facts whereby that sanc-
tion should ever be applied." '
83. See text accompanying notes 54-57 supra.
84. 542 F.2d 1090 (9th Cir. 1976). See also Al Barnett & Son, Inc. v. Outboard
Marine Corp., 611 F.2d 32 (3d Cir. 1979); Jones v. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n, 602
F.2d 94 (5th Cir. 1979); Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 231 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Hall v. Leon
County Bldg. Supply Co., 84 F.R.D. 372 (N.D. Fla. 1979); Goodsons & Co. v. National
Am. Corp., 78 F.R.D. 721 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Conrad Music v. Modern Distribs., Inc.,
433 F. Supp. 269 (C.D. Cal. 1977); Roberts v. Norden Div., United Aircraft Corp., 76
F.R.D. 75 (E.D.N.Y. 1977). But cf. United Artists Corp. v. Freeman, 605 F.2d 854
(5th Cir. 1979) (court of appeals overturned default judgment imposed by trial court
for failure of defendant to answer questions at deposition finding that defendant had
done so believing he was privileged because of ignorance, not because of a willful
disregard of the judicial process); Griffin v. Aluminum Co. of America, 564 F.2d 1171
(5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (court held that dismissal of plaintiffs action for failure
to appear at deposition was inappropriate since plaintiff was proceeding in forma
pauperis and did not understand his discovery obligations); SEC v. Research Auto-
mation Corp., 521 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1975) (rule 37(d) could not be invoked where
defendant was uncooperative at his deposition since rule 37(d) only applies when the
person fails to appear for the deposition).
85. 427 U.S. 639 (1976) (per curiam).
86. In re Professional Hockey Antitrust Litigation, 63 F.R.D. 641, 656 (E.D. Pa.
1974).
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Although the court of appeals reversed the decision, 7 the
Supreme Court in turn reversed the court of appeals, noting
that reviewing courts tend to be unduly influenced by the se-
verity of dismissal. According to the Court, dismissal must be
available to district courts, not merely to penalize those who
have merited the sanction, but also to deter those who might
be willing to engage in similar conduct. The Court held that
the trial court had not abused its discretion in dismissing the
case.
88
This decision has prompted many trial courts to be more
strict in imposing sanctions. It has also induced appellate
courts to more readily uphold impositon of the ultimate sanc-
tion of dismissal.8 " Emerick v. Fennick Industries Inc.,90 illus-
trates the emerging judicial attitude. In this case, the defen-
dant only partially complied with requests to produce
documents and answer interrogatories even though the trial
87. In re Professional Hockey Antitrust Litigation, 531 F.2d 1188 (3d Cir. 1976).
88. National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639
(1976) (per curiam).
89. In upholding a trial court's dismissal of a case for plaintiffs willful failure to
produce documents even though the documents had finally been produced after the
motion for sanctions was made, the court of appeals in Margoles v.' Johns, 587 F.2d
885, 888 (7th Cir. 1978), stated: "Any effort on the part of this court to promote
lenity rather than the harshness of an outright dismissal would undermine important
objectives of Rule 37." But cf. Griffin v. Aluminum Co. of America, 564 F.2d 1171
(5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (court held that trial court had abused its discretion in
imposing dismissal since the plaintiff did not fully understand his discovery obliga-
tions); Edgar v. Slaughter, 548 F.2d 770 (8th Cir. 1977) (court held that since the
client was not in bad faith in failing to answer interrogatories because of counsel's
dilatoriness, dismissal should not be imposed).
In dismissing plaintiff's case for failure to comply with discovery requests, even
after being cautioned that failure to make discovery would result in dismissal, the
court in Denton v. Mr. Swiss of Missouri, Inc., 564 F.2d 236, 240-41 (8th Cir. 1977),
stated that counsel had engaged in conduct which amounted to flagrant noncompli-
ance with the court's orders. Noting that a party is responsible for his counsel, the
court stated that dismissal should be imposed against the party because to do other-
wise would be tolerating tactics which cannot be condoned by the judicial system.
In Independent Investor Protective League v. Touche Ross & Co., 607 F.2d 1054
(9th Cir. 1979), the court upheld the dismissal with prejudice of plaintiff's complaint,
holding that the trial court had not abused its discretion. The trial court originally
granted a motion to compel response, rule 37(a)(2), because the plaintiff and his
counsel failed to answer interrogatories. When plaintiff failed to comply with this
order, defendant moved for dismissal which the trial court granted after an eviden-
tiary hearing had been held. The court also imposed expenses on the plaintiff and his
attorney. See also Szilvassy v. United States, 82 F.R.D. 752 (S.D.N.Y. 1979);
Dependahl v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 84 F.R.D. 416 (E.D. Mo. 1979). See generally
Epstein, supra note 34.
90. 539 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir. 1976).
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court had ordered compliance. In upholding the trial court's
imposition of a default judgment against the defendant, the
court of appeals cited National Hockey League saying: "Al-
though we could infer that, following imposition of a more le-
nient sanction, the chastened appellant might have complied
with the district court's orders, the Supreme Court has em-
phasized the deterrent aspect of Rule 37(b)(2) sanctions." 91
Notwithstanding National Hockey League, constitutional
limitations remain on the propriety of dismissal. In Campbell
v. Gerrans,9 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the
trial court's dismissal for plaintiff's failure to answer several
interrogatories. The court of appeals held that since the plain-
tiff had invoked the fifth amendment in regard to the inter-
rogatories, the trial court committed an abuse of discretion or-
dering dismissal. A refusal to answer interrogatories based on
the fifth amendment cannot automatically be characterized as
a willful default justifying dismissal.
Some courts have nevertheless upheld dismissal sanctions
against constitutional due process claims. In G-K Properties
v. Redevelopment Agency of San Jose,93 the court determined
that Societe Internationale does not mandate invalidating a
dismissal order unless the party can show that failure to com-
ply with discovery orders was due to circumstances beyond his
control. In DiGregorio v. First Rediscount Corp., the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals asserted that sanctions only violate
due process ivhen the sanctions invoked constitute "mere
punishment."94
Since National Hockey League, some courts have ex-
pressly indicated that parties who flaunt the rules cannot ex-
pect to receive light sanctions. The district court in Perry v.
Golub95 dismissed one of defendant's petitions because he
continually refused to obey a court order to furnish docu-
ments. In articulating its policy that parties cannot withhold
documents and then expect light sanctions by later offering to
91. Id. at 1381.
92. 592 F.2d 1054 (9th Cir. 1979). See also United Artists Corp. v. Freeman, 605
F.2d 854 (5th Cir. 1979) (court of appeals reversed trial court's imposition of a default
judgment finding that defendant had refused to answer questions asked in deposition
because of ignorance, not willful disregard of the judicial process).
93. 577 F.2d 645, 648 (9th Cir. 1978).
94. 506 F.2d 781, 789 (3d Cir. 1974). Accord, Norman v. Young, 422 F.2d 470,
474 (10th Cir. 1970); Ohio v. Crofters, Inc., 75 F.R.D. 12, 24 (D. Colo. 1977).
95. 74 F.R.D. 360 (N.D. Ala. 1976).
1981]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
produce them, the court stated: "After having refused to com-
ply with the Court's Order, the defendants now ask for a light
sanction by agreeing to do what they were ordered to do al-
most a month ago."' 6 The court also cited National Hockey
League in arguing that sanctions are needed as a deterrent
against disregarding orders.
In Dellums v. Powell,7 the court held that the trial court
could not refuse to dismiss a plaintiff for failure to answer in-
terrogatories. This case is unique because the appellate court
imposed a stricter sanction than did the trial court. The trial
court originally dismissed three plaintiffs for failure to answer
interrogatories under rule 37(d). On motion by the plaintiffs,
the trial court then reinstated them. The court of appeals
found that one of the plaintiffs completely understood his ob-
ligation, but refused to answer interrogatories. Citing the de-
terrent purpose of sanctions as discussed in National Hockey
League, the appellate court held that it was an abuse of dis-
cretion to reinstate the plaintiff who knowingly refused to an-
swer the interrogatories. In effect, this decision requires dis-
missal of a party for intentional misconduct.
Most appellate courts have not adopted this strict ap-
proach. Instead, they permit the trial court to exercise its dis-
cretion in determining what sanctions should be employed.
Although the court in Surg-O-Flex of America, Inc. v. Bergen
Brunswig Co." found that the plaintiff, by failing to satisfy
the court's discovery order, had clearly manifested the type of
flagrant bad faith needed to impose dismissal, the court de-
clined to impose this sanction. Instead, the court exercised its
discretion to estop plaintiff from using any documents which
were the subject of defendant's discovery request, and im-
posed attorney's fees.
96. Id. at 365.
.97. 566 F.2d 231 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Other courts have also flatly refused to apply
light sanctions when parties and attorneys have flaunted the rules. See Cine Forty-
Second St. Theatre Corp. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 602 F.2d 1062 (2d Cir.
1979)(court dismissed party's suit for gross negligence of his counsel in failing to com-
ply with order); Riverside Memorial Mausoleum, Inc. v. Sonnenblick-Goldman Corp.,
80 F.R.D. 433 (E.D. Penn. 1978)(plaintiffs were precluded from using evidence at trial
for failure to timely answer interrogatories when judge had cautioned plaintiff that
disregard of orders would not go unnoticed); SCM Societa Commerciale S.P.A. v. In-
dustrial and Commercial Research Corp., 72 F.R.D. 110 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
98. 76 F.R.D. 654 (D. Conn. 1977). See also Kozlowski v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
73 F.R.D. 73 (D. Mass. 1976).
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The Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed the holding
in National Hockey League. In Roadway Express, Inc. v.
Piper," plaintiffs failed to answer interrogatories and failed to
file a brief as ordered by the trial court. The Supreme Court
ruled that by not complying with the order, plaintiffs had ex-
posed themselves to liability under rule 37(b). Emphasizing
the fact that rule 37 sanctions must be diligently applied, the
Court remanded the case to the trial court ir dicating that the
court could impose monetary sanctions againet the plaintiffs.
In EEOC v. Carter Carburetor,00 however, the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a discovery sanction im-
posed upon the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) for willful refusal to answer interrogatories. The
EEOC originally filed suit against Carter Carburetor alleging
racial discrimination in its employment practices. When the
defendant served interrogatories on the EEOC requesting the
names of all persons affected by the alleged discriminatory
hiring practices, the EEOC sought a stay in answering these
interrogatories. The judge denied it.
When the EEOC responded that it was unable to identify
other instances of discrimination until discovery had been
concluded, the defendant moved for sanctions. The parties
failed to resolve the problem among themselves, and the trial
court entered its order of sanctions. These sanctions pre-
vented the EEOC from offering evidence of discrimination on
behalf of any person except those identified in the original
complaint, and imposed a $500 monetary sanction on the
plaintiff to pay defendant's attorney's fees.10
The court of appeals issued a writ of mandate, finding
that the district court exceeded its judicial power in imposing
sanctions, since the defendant had never filed a formal objec-
tion to the response filed by the EEOC, nor had moved to
compel further response under rule 37(a). In addition, because
the trial court entered sanctions without permitting the
EEOC an opportunity to present its position the appellate
court ordered the district court to withdraw its order.
Although the Supreme Court denied the writ of certiorari
in this case, Justice Powell, joined by Justices Stewart and
99. 477 U.S. 752, 764-65 (1980).
100. 577 F.2d 43 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1081 (1979).
101. EEOC v. Carter Carburetor, 76 F.R.D. 143, 145 (E.D. Mo. 1977).
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Rehnquist, filed a vigorous dissent in the disposition. The dis-
senters argued that the decision of the court of appeals was
inconsistent with "principles vital to the proper functioning of
the federal courts.' 110 2
C. New Amendments to the Federal Plan
Unethical use of discovery procedures has been the focus
of discussion and study by the Bench and Bar for some time.
The Pound Conference, held in 1976 under the joint sponsor-
ship of the Conference of Chief Justices, the Judicial Confer-
ence of the United States, and the American Bar Association,
resulted in the formation of a task force to evaluate the issues
and recommend solutions.'03
Chief Justice Burger also appointed an Advisory Commit-
tee on Civil Rules to conduct hearings on discovery abuse.a 4
The Advisory Committee requested that the ABA Section of
Litigation examine the issue. As a result, the Section of Liti-
gation recommended proposed amendments to the Federal
Rules.'015
The proposals developed by the ABA Section of Litiga-
102. 439 U.S. 1081, 1081 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting). The dissenters attacked
the decision of the court of appeals as being in conflict with National Hockey League.
Noting that the sanctions imposed by the trial court were for virtually the same rea-
son as the sanctions imposed in National Hockey League, a failure to answer inter-
rogatories, the dissenters argued that the court of appeals failed to demonstrate an
abuse of discretion by the trial court. Id. at 1086.
The dissenters also argued that this decision would discourage attempts to curb
discovery excesses. But Justice Powell was particularly concerned with the fact that a
"district court before which a case is being litigated is in a far better position than a
court of appeals to supervise and control discovery and to impose sanctions for its
abuse." Id. at 1087-88. The dissenters concluded their argument by saying, "It is a
serious matter for a court of appeals to undercut a district court's authority on ques-
tions of this kind, which are peculiarly within its discretion and competency." Id. at
1088.
103. See The Pound Conference, 70 F.R.D. 79 (1976). See also Report of the
Pound Conference Follow-Up Task Force, 74 F.R.D. 159, 191-94 (1977); Bell, The
Pound Conference Follow-Up: A Response From the United States Department of
Justice, 76 F.R.D. 320, 328-29 (1977); Erickson, The Pound Conference Recommen-
dations: A Blueprint for the Justice System in the Twenty-First Century, 76 F.R.D.
277, 288-92 (1977).
104. Burger, Agenda for 2000 A.D.-A Need for Systematic Anticipation, 70
F.R.D. 83, 95-96 (1976). The Advisory Committee reports to the Committee on Rules
of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States.
105. ABA Discovery Abuse Report, supra note 15. For an evaluation of this
report see UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTIcE, THE ANNUAL REPORT OF THE AT-
TORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 1977, at 13-15 (1978).
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tion were passed along by the Chief Justice's Advisory Com-
mittee to the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure
of the Judicial Conference. The Committee considered the
proposals, and, after hearings, revised and adopted many of
them. The Supreme Court then adopted the Committee's pro-
posals as amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.106
In its report, the Section of Litigation proposed an
amendment to rule 26(b)(1) which would have limited the
scope of discovery to "issues raised by the claims or defenses
of any party. ' 10 7 The Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure, however, declined to adopt this recommendation,
reasoning that the language was too general and would not
prevent abuse. The Committee did delete the term "subject
matter" from the rule with the expectation that this deletion
would curtail expansive discovery.' 08 This deletion was not,
however, incorporated into the 1979 proposals because the
Committee decided that "abuse of discovery . . . is not so
general as to require such basic. changes in the rules that gov-
ern discovery in all cases."10' 9 The new amendments adopted
by the Supreme Court do not effectively limit the scope of
discovery.
Rule 37, as currently written, is deficient because it does
not by its terms explicitly apply to parties and attorneys who
use excessive and unnecessary discovery procedures. 10 If a
party finds that discovery requests are burdensome or unnec-
essary, a protective order may be sought under rule 26(c).
However, similar to rule 37(a)(4), rule 26(c) only permits ex-
106. See 1978 Proposed Amendments, supra note 25; 1979 Proposed Amend-
ments, supra note 28; 1980 Amendments, supra note 29. See generally D. SEGAL,
SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE ON DISCOVERY FROM 1970 TO THE PRESENT: EXPRESSED DIs-
SATISFACTIONS AND PROPOSED REFORMS (1978); Cutner, supra note 2; Perlman, supra
note 35; Schroeder & Frank, supra note 8; Werner, supra note 20, at 329-31.
107. ABA Discovery Abuse Report, supra note 15, at 2.
108. 1978 Proposed Amendments, supra note 25, at 623, 626-28.
109. 1979 Proposed Amendments, supra note 28, at 332. For a further explana-
tion of why amendments to this rule were rejected see 1980 Amendments, supra note
29, app. A, at 541-42. See generally Perlman, supra note 35, at 59-64; Schroeder &
Frank, supra note 8, at 478-83.
110. See generally Cohn, supra note 18; Erickson, supra note 103, at 289; Mc-
Kinstry, supra note 13, at 799; Werner, supra note 20, at 329. But cf. Renfrew, supra
note 9, at 268 (author argues that rule 37(a)(4) can be imposed on parties or attor-
neys who make unreasonable discovery demands as well as those who oppose reasona-
ble demands).
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penses in bringing the motion; no other sanctions are
authorized.
Rule 37 as amended does not expressly recognize the au-
thority to impose discovery sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927,
nor does it expressly provide sanctions for parties who seek
unnecessary discovery. Thus, not all improper discovery tac-
tics are covered by the new rules."' The Committee may have
believed that its adoption of subdivision (f) to rule 26 would
eliminate this "loophole."
The ABA Section of Litigation proposed an additional
subdivision (e) to rule 37 which would have authorized a court
to deal summarily with discovery abuses. Not only did the
proposed amendment recognize that sanctions could be im-
posed under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, it would also have authorized
"sanctions as may be just, including the payment of reasona-
ble expenses and attorneys' fees, if any party or counsel...
(ii) otherwise abuses the discovery process in seeking, making
or resisting discovery.""' 2 The 1978 Proposed Amendments in-
cluded this language, but it was deleted from the 1979 propos-
als. The amendments adopted by the Supreme Court likewise
do not include a subdivision (e) because the Committee found
111. The failure to enact amendment (e) to rule 37 is also important because it
would have given the court authority to impose sanctions for failure to supplement
interrogatories or for dumping documents, failures which are not presently covered
by rule 37.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(e) requires that a party supplement his responses to discovery
requests in certain instances. Rule 37 sanctions can be utilized to compel a response if
the party discovers that the other party has new or additional information which
requires supplementation. He can move for an order to compel under rule 37(a), and
if it is not complied with, can seek sanctions under rule 37(b). However, if the party
does not discover the information until trial, sanctions under rule 37 cannot be
sought since they do not encompass this situation. The proposed subdivision (e)
would have given a court authority to impose sanctions in this situation. See gener-
ally Perlman, supra note 35, at 96.
Proposed rule 37(e) would have also authorized sanctions for dumping docu-
ments because it related to all abuses in "seeking, making or resisting discovery."
ABA Discovery Abuse Report, supra note 15, at 24. The Committee on Rules of Prac-
tice and Procedure has sought to alleviate this problem by amending rule 34 which
provides for the production of documents. The amendment requires that "[a] party
who produces documents for inspection shall produce them as they are kept in the
usual course of business or shall organize and label them to correspond with the cate-
gories in the request." 1980 Amendments, supra note 29, at 532. This amendment as
adopted substantially conforms to the recommendation made by the Section of Liti-
gation. Its purpose is to ensure that the documents have an internal logic, thereby
making them easier to examine. See ABA Discovery Abuse Report, supra note 15, at
22.
112. ABA Discovery Abuse Report, supra note 15, at 23-24.
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the proposed language too broad.11
Rule 26(f) provides for a discovery conference on motion
by counsel for one of the parties. Before making the motion,
the attorney must first make a reasonable effort to reach
agreement with opposing counsel on the matters set forth in
the motion. Each party has a duty under the rule to partici-
pate in good faith in framing a discovery plan. The court is
then permitted to enter an order identifying the issues for dis-
covery purposes, a plan and schedule for discovery, as well as
any limitations on discovery. The rule also permits the discov-
ery conference to be held in conjunction with the pretrial
conference. "
To ensure compliance with discovery conference orders,
rule 37 has been amended so that rule 37(b)(2) sanctions are
available for failure to obey discovery conference orders. A
new subdivision (g) has also been added to rule 37. This
amendment authorizes a court to impose expenses including
attorney's fees upon a party or his attorney for failure to par-
ticipate in good faith in the framing of a discovery plan.
115
The ABA Discovery Abuse Report also recommended
that the number of interrogatories of right be limited to
thirty, but this recommendation was not adopted by the Com-
mittee. The Committee felt this proposal would embroil the
courts in endless disputes."" On the recommendation of the
Committee, the Supreme Court, however, did adopt an
amendment to rule 33(c) that requires a party answering an
interrogatory by specifying records to do so in sufficient detail
to permit the interrogating party to locate and to identify the
records in which the answer may be ascertained.
7
113. 1980 Amendments, supra note 29, app. A, at 544.
114. 1980 Amendments, supra note 29, at 526. See also ABA Discovery Abuse
Report, supra note 15, at 4-7. The drafters also explained that the discovery confer-
ence is not to be routinely used. 1980 Amendments, supra note 29, at 527.
115. 1980 Amendments, supra note 29, at 532-33. Also, the current subdivision
(e) of rule 37 was stricken since 28 U.S.C. § 1783 no longer refers to sanctions. Id. at
533. In addition, a proposed subdivision (f) of rule 37 which would have expressly
permitted the court to notify the Attorney General of the United States that its of-
ficers or attorneys had failed to participate in good faith in discovery was deleted.
The Committee found that courts already have this authority. Report of the Stand-
ing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, 1980 Amendments, supra note
29, at 536-37; 1979 Proposed Amendments, supra note 28, at 347.
116. ABA Discovery Abuse Report, supra note 15, at 18; 1978 Proposed
Amendments, supra note 25, at 648.
117. 1980 Amendments, supra note 29, at 531.
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Although the new amendments establish the procedures
for a discovery conference, an addition which may result in
increased judicial oversight of the discovery process, the lim-
ited coverage of rule 37 still allows parties and attorneys to
circumvent their discovery responsibilities. As Justice Powell
stated in dissenting from the adoption of these amendments,
"[tihe changes embodied in the amendments fall short of
those needed to accomplish reforms in civil litigation that are
long overdue." ' 8
D. Alternative Methods of Curbing Discovery Abuse
An alternative means of curbing unnecessary discovery
lies in the power of district courts to enact local rules under
the authority of rule 83." 9 Using this method, courts could
enact rules designed to ameliorate problems not expressly en-
compassed by the Federal Rules. 20
Another possible source of sanctions is the imposition of
costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1927. This provision permits a court
to impose costs against an attorney for multiplying proceed-
ings that vexatiously increase costs. The statutory language is
broad enough to embody attempts to increase costs by abus-
ing discovery,' 2 ' but this provision has seen little use in the
discovery arena. One reason for this minimal usage is that
118. Id. at 521 (Powell, J., dissenting) (Justices Stewart and Rehnquist joined
Justice Powell's dissenting statement).
119. See generally Cohn, supra note 18; Renfrew, supra note 9, at 270; Com-
ment, supra note 46, at 633-36. See also In re Sutter, 543 F.2d 1030 (2d Cir. 1976)
(district courts may promulgate rules that impose sanctions for lawyers' conduct
which falls short of contempt of court).
120. A potential hindrance to the application of rule 83 is the ruling by some
courts that rule 37 is the exclusive authority for sanctions. See, e.g., Countryside Cas.
Co. v. Orr, 523 F.2d 870, 872 n.3 (8th Cir. 1975). See generally Werner, supra note 20,
at 324.
Rule 41(b) is a potential alternative source for sanctions. "For failure of the
plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order of court, a defendant
may move for dismissal of an action or of any claim against him." FED. R. Civ. P.
41(b). But the Supreme Court in Societe Internationale held that where a party
failed to comply with a discovery order dismissal could only be imposed under rule
37; the court of appeals could not utilize rule 41(b) to impose dismissal. 357 U.S. at
206-08. It can be argued, however, that this ruling simply makes rule 37 the sole
source of sanctions if the discovery violation is expressly addressed in rule 37. Other-
wise, sanctions authorized from other sources may be used. See Perlman, supra note
35, at 97-98.
121. See generally Renfrew, supra note 9, at 269; Werner, supra note 20, at
322-23; Comment, supra note 46, at 623-29.
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courts have construed the statute to require notice and hear-
ing before imposing costs, ' as well as a showing that the at-
torney willfully or recklessly increased costs."2 3
A case recently decided by the Supreme Court also limits
the potential availability of § 1927. In Roadway Express, Inc.
v. Piper1"" plaintiffs brought a civil rights class action alleging.
racial discrimination. Plaintiffs, however, failed to answer in-
terrogatories, forcing the defendant to move for an order com-
pelling answers. When plaintiffs failed to comply with the
court order, defendant moved for dismissal under rule 37(b)
and sought costs and attorney's fees. Basing its decision on
civil rights statutes 42 U.S.C. §§ 1988, 2000e-5(k), and 28
U.S.C. § 1927, the trial court held that plaintiffs' attorneys
were liable for all the costs and attorney's fees incurred by the
defendant.
The court of appeals reversed this decision and the Su-
preme Court affirmed, holding that "costs" in 28 U.S.C. §
1927 are implicitly limited to costs enumerated in 28 U.S.C. §
1920, and that the availability of attorney's fees under the
civil rights statutes cannot, therefore, be used to define
"costs" under 28 U.S.C. § 1927.
The 1978 Proposed Amendments '26 would have recog-
nized the authority of a court to impose costs under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1927 in the discovery area, but the 1979 Proposed Amend-
ments excluded these changes.
In exceptional cases, a court may use its inherent power
to impose sanctions for abuse of the judicial process. In Link
v. Wabash Railroad,"2 6 the Supreme Court upheld the trial
court's sua sponte dismissal of the plaintiff for failure to pros-
ecute. The Court stated that inherent power is "governed not
by rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in
courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly
and expeditious disposition of cases.
1 2 7
A court's inherent powers were also at issue in the Road-
122. Miles v. Dickson, 387 F.2d 716, 717 (5th Cir. 1967).
123. United States v. Ross, 535 F.2d 346, 350 (6th Cir. 1976).
124. 447 U.S. 752 (1980).
125. See 1978 Proposed Amendments, supra note 25, at 625-26, 652-53.
126. 370 U.S. 626 (1962).
127. Id. at 630. For a judge's perspective on inherent authority see Renfrew,
supra note 9, at 268-69.
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way Express case.He The Supreme Court noted that in nar-
rowly defined circumstances federal courts do have inherent
power to assess attorney's fees against counsel. The Court
stated: "If a court may tax counsel fees against a party who
has litigated in bad faith, it certainly may assess those
expenses against counsel who wilfully abuse judicial
processes." 9 Before imposing these expenses a court must as-
certain that the attorney acted in bad faith. In Roadway Ex-
press, the Court remanded the case so that the trial court
could make a determination, after notice and hearing, of
whether or not the attorneys involved had acted in bad faith.
III. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SANCTIONS UNDER THE
CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND THE FEDERAL
RULES
The primary authority for sanctions under the California
Code of Civil Procedure is section 2034, which was originally
based upon Federal Rule 37.180 When rule 37 was substan-
tially revised in 1970, these revisions extinguished many of
the discrepancies which had existed in the rule. Section 2034,
although amended in recent years, still contains many of the
"loopholes" which were eliminated from rule 37 by the 1970
amendments.
California discovery provisions" ' have been interpreted
to favor disclosure, making them even more liberal than the
Federal Rules.
For the guidance of the trial courts the proper rule is de-
clared to be not only one of liberal interpretation, but one
that also recognizes that disclosure is a matter of right
unless statutory or public policy considerations clearly
prohibit it.182
128. 447 U.S. at 752.
129. Id. at 756.
130. Comment, The Decline and Fall of Sanctions in California Discovery:
Time to Modernize California Code of Civil Procedure Section 2034, 9 U.S.F. L. REv.
360, 360-61 (1974).
131. See CAL. CIv. Paoc. CODE §§ 2016-2037 (West Supp. 1980). Amendments
have recently been enacted. See Act of July 19, 1980, ch. 677, §§ 1-3, 1980 Cal. Legis.
Serv. 2099 (West) (amending §§ 2019, 2030); Act of June 17, 1980, ch. 186, § 1, 1980
Cal. Legis. Serv. 569 (West) (amending § 2030); Act of February 29, 1980, ch. 23, §§ 1-
2, 1980 Cal. Legis. Serv. 93 (West) (amending §§ 2031, 2034).
132. Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 2d 355, 378, 364 P.2d 266, 276,
15 Cal. Rptr. 90, 100 (1961). In In re Bongfeldt, 22 Cal. App. 3d 465, 475, 99 Cal.
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The scope of allowable discovery is also broad, based on
the Federal Rules' "relevancy to the subject matter test."33
Any doubts about the relevance of information requested
must be resolved in favor of discovery." " However, trial courts
do retain discretion in determining whether or not informa-
tion is to be disclosed and whether or not sanctions are to be
imposed for failure to comply with discovery requests." 5
In addition to section 2034, section 2019(b)(1) authorizes
the court to protect a deponent from inquiry into specified
areas. Section 2019(b)(1) authorizes the court to "make any
other order which justice requires to protect the party or wit-
ness from annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression."3 6 The
court has great latitude in applying sanctions under this pro-
vision. In Thoren v. Johnston and Washer 31 the appellate
court upheld the trial court's order barring testimony of an
undisclosed witness because the party willfully failed to di-
vulge the name of this witness as requested by interrogatories.
The court cited section 2030(c), which incorporates section
2019(b)(1), as the authority for this order.
In A&M Records, Inc. v. Heilman3 6 the trial court issued
Rptr. 428, 434 (1971), the court stated: "It is the public policy of California that
litigants be liberally afforded discovery to the end that justice be dispensed fairly and
speedily." See also H. GROSSMAN & A. VAN ALSTYNE, 13 CALIFORNIA PRACTICE § 22, at
50 (1972).
133. See CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE §§ 2016(b), 2030(c), 2031(a) (West Supp. 1981).
134. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 161, 173, 465 P.2d 854,
863, 84 Cal. Rptr. 718, 727 (1970).
135. See, e.g., Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 2d 355, 378, 364 P.2d
266, 277, 15 Cal. Rptr. 90, 101 (1961); Deyo v. Kilbourne, 84 Cal. App. 3d 771, 796,
149 Cal. Rptr. 499, 518 (1978); Richards v. Superior Court, 86 Cal. App. 3d 265, 269,
150 Cal. Rptr. 77, 79 (1978); Zorro Inv. Co. v. Great Pac. Sec. Inc., 69 Cal. App. 3d
907, 918, 138 Cal. Rptr. 410, 415 (1977).
136. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 2019(b)(1) (West Supp. 1981). This same provision
is also incorporated in CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 2030(c) (interrogatories), 2033(c) (ad-
missions) (West Supp. 1980). See also H. GROSSMAN & A. VAN ALSTYNE, supra note
132, § 25, at 63. This provision, § 2019(b)(1), is similar to FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
A party seeking a protective order under Section 2019(b)(1) to prevent the taking
of a deposition has the burden of establishing good cause for such an order. See, e.g.,
Hauk v. Superior Court, 61 Cal. 2d 295, 391 P.2d 825, 38 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1964); Grey-
hound Corp. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 2d 355, 364 P.2d 266, 15 Cal. Rptr. 90 (1961);
State Dep't of Health Serv. v. Superior Court, 104 Cal. App. 3d 80, 163 Cal. Rptr. 414
(1980).
137. 20 Cal. App. 3d 270, 105 Cal. Rptr. 276 (1972). See also United Farm
Workers of America, AFL-CIO v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. App. 3d 334, 120 Cal. Rptr.
904 (1975) (court held that trial court may impose sanctions for unduly frivolous or
oppressive interrogatories, but it may not strike an entire interrogatory).
138. 75 Cal. App. 3d 554, 566-67, 142 Cal. Rptr. 390, 397-98 (1977). Section
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
an order precluding the defendant from offering documents at
trial which he had refused to produce in discovery. The order
also precluded the defendant from testifying on matters which
he had refused to answer at his deposition on the basis of the
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The de-
fendant argued that the court could not limit this testimony
since he had not disobeyed any court orders, a prerequisite to
applying sanctions under section 2034(b). The appellate court
held that under section 2019(b)(1) a court has the power to
make an order which protects the deposing party, as well as
the party deposed, from oppression. Thus, the trial court was
authorized to order the deponent not to waive his privilege
against self-incrimination at trial since he had used it to block
discovery.
A court may also impose expenses, including attorney's
fees, in granting or refusing an order under section 2019(b)(1).
In Flynn v. Superior Court,5 9 the court held that a party who
sought a stay of deposition in good faith pending hearing on a
motion to quash could not be assessed expenses because of
failure to appear at the deposition. The party was, however,
assessed costs and attorney's fees for forcing the real party in
interest to seek a protective order when an earlier hearing
date on the motion to quash would have absolved the need to
seek the protective order.
Similar to federal case law, few California cases have
found an inherent judicial power to apply sanctions for failure
to make discovery. The court in Fairfield v. Superior Court140
upheld sanctions against a party for failure to obey the trial
court's order for further responses under section 2030(a). Sec-
tion 2030 does not expressly authorize sanctions for refusing
to obey a court order, but the appellate court felt that every
court has the power to compel obedience to its judgment.
Thus the Fairfield court determined that section 2034(b)(2)
sanctions could be applied for refusal to obey a section
2030(a) court order.
Other courts, however, have held that there is no inherent
2019(b)(1) may also be used by the court to order criminal misdemeanor immunity
for witnesses testifying in a civil case. See Rysdale v. Superior Court, 81 Cal. App. 3d
280, 146 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1978).
139. 89 Cal. App. 3d 491, 152 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1979).
140. 246 Cal. App. 2d 113, 54 Cal. Rptr. 721 (1966).
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authority to apply sanctions."" In Bauguess v. Paine""' the
California Supreme Court overturned sanctions imposed by
the trial court on plaintiff's attorney. The trial court had or-
dered plaintiff's attorney to pay $700 in attorney's fees to the
defendant after a mistrial was granted because of the attor-
ney's actions. Noting that it is traditional for litigants to bear
their own attorney's fees and that no statute authorizes fee
awards following a mistrial, the California court held that this
case was not analogous to the situation involved in Fairfield,
and the award of attorney's fees exceeded the proper limits of
the court's inherent powers.' 43
Recent cases have followed the Bauguess decision. In
Evarone v. Twentieth Century Hosts, Inc.14 4 the trial court
struck a defendant's answer and entered a default judgment
against him for counsel's failure to appear at a settlement
conference and a hearing. The appellate court reversed, hold-
ing that neither the applicable statutes or rules of court grant
a court jurisdictional authority to enter default without spe-
cific authorization.
In Fabricant v. Superior Court14' the trial court ordered
the petitioner to pay $375 to three attorneys for abusing the
subpoena power of the court. The petitioner, a defendant in a
141. E.g., Young v. Redman, 55 Cal. App. 3d 827, 128 Cal. Rptr. 86 (1976); Wis-
niewski v. Clary, 46 Cal. App. 3d 499, 120 Cal. Rptr. 176 (1975). Contra, Santandrea
v. Siltec Corp., 56 Cal. App. 3d 525, 128 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1976) where the court ordered
appellants to pay reasonable expenses including attorney's fees to the respondents for
forcing them to contest the appellants' unauthorized motion. Although no explicit
statutory authority existed for the imposition of this sanction, the court found that
courts must be able to control the conduct of their business stating: "The exercise of
the court's inherent power to provide for the orderly conduct of the court's business
is a matter vested in the sound legal discretion of the court." Id. at 530, 128 Cal.
Rptr. at 632.
142. 22 Cal. 3d 626, 586 P.2d 942, 150 Cal. Rptr. 461 (1978).
143. Id. The court also expressly disapproved the decision in Santandrea v.
Siltec Corp., 56 Cal. App. 3d 525, 128 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1976), which had approved the
imposition of sanctions through the exercise of inherent powers. Id. at 639 n.8, 586
P.2d at 950 n.8, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 469 n.8. In expounding upon the Bauguess decision,
the court in Yarnell & Assoc. v. Superior Court, 106 Cal. App. 3d 918, 165 Cal. Rptr.
421 (1980), found that the awarding of attorney's fees or sanctions, no matter how
they are denominated, is invalid without express statutory authorization. The trial
court had imposed a $250 sanction against the cross-defendant for filing a frivolous
motion. But the appellate court reversed the sanction stating that these fees were
improper under both the court's supervisory power and Code of Civil Procedure §
128.
144. 98 Cal. App. 3d 90, 159 Cal. Rptr. 294 (1979).
145. 104 Cal. App. 3d 905, 163 Cal. Rptr. 894 (1980).
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criminal case involving possession of a firearm by an ex-con-
vict, had subpoenaed the attorneys to establish the communi-
cation facilities available to private counsel. Petitioner wanted
this evidence to support his argument that a telephone should
be installed in his jail cell. The appellate court overturned this
sanction holding that the awarding of the fees exceeded the
proper limits of the trial court's power. In citing Bauguess the
court concluded that inherent authority does not authorize fee
awards to participants in litigation where there is a general
legislative policy denying such awards, and where no statute
or recognized exception is applicable.
A. Section 2034(a)
Section 2034(a) provides a vehicle to make discovery in a
variety of situations. Under this subsection, a party may move
the court to compel an answer or produce documents or books
if the other side or a deponent refuses or fails to answer a
question or produce documents or books at a deposition. A
motion to compel may also be made if a party refuses or fails
to answer an interrogatory under section 2030,1 6 and a party
may request answers or further answers to requests for admis-
sions as permitted in section 2033. Additionally, a party may
seek to compel compliance with a request for inspection under
section 2031.
If the court finds that the failure, refusal, or objection to
discovery was not substantially justified,47 or that an answer
did not comply with section 2033, then the court may require
that party to pay reasonable expenses. If the motion to com-
pel is denied, the court may impose expenses on the moving
party. If a party fails to answer a request for admissions as
ordered by the court, then such matters will be deemed ad-
mitted, subject only to relief as permitted by section 2033.
Prior to the 1974 and 1978 amendments to subsection (a),
only "refusals" to abide by discovery requests were subject to
the statute. Sanctions were not available unless the requesting
146. When a motion is made to compel an answer to an interrogatory the bur-
den is on the objector to demonstrate the validity of his objection. See Coy v. Supe-
rior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 210, 373 P.2d 457, 23 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1962).
147. See Union Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 80 Cal. App. 3d 1, 145 Cal.
Rptr. 316 (1978) (court held that expenses could not be imposed for refusal to answer
interrogatories where novel questions were involved; thus, the refusing party was sub-
stantially justified in its noncompliance).
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party could show willfulness on the part of the other party. By
adding the term "fails", this provision has been brought into
closer congruence with Federal Rule 37(a). In rule 37(a), "fail-
ure" has been interpreted to permit a party to seek sanctions
for any noncompliance or negligence by the opposition in re-
gard to discovery requests.1 4 8 The impact of the amendment
in California is still unclear.149
Under section 2034(a) as currently written, it is unclear
whether an objection to an interrogatory requires the party
seeking discovery to make a motion to compel further answers
under section 2030(a), or a motion to compel under section
2034(a). 1 0 Section 2030(a) provides for a motion to compel
further response if the other side answers or objects to an in-
terrogatory. A motion to compel under the amended section
2034(a) may only be sought if the party refuses or fails to an-
swer an interrogatory. The court may require the party or at-
torney who refuses, fails, or objects, to pay expenses incurred
in seeking a section 2034(a) motion, but there is no provision
for expenses under section 2030(a).
If the terms "fails" or "refusal" include making objec-
tions, then a party need not seek a motion to compel further
answers under section 2030(a). However, this interpretation
loses its forcefulness when section 2034(a) is read in its total-
ity. The term "objection" is explicitly used in this provision in
relation to admissions, but not interrogatories. If the term
"fails" includes objections, then the use of the term "objec-
tions" in the clause relating to admissions is mere surplusage
since "fails" would accomplish the same purpose. Therefore, a
motion for further answers under section 2030(a) may still be
required if the other side objects to the interrogatories instead
of filing answers.
The distinction is important because not only is there no
provision for obtaining expenses under section 2030(a),
neither is there an explicit provision for sanctions if the party
148. See text accompanying note 42 supra.
149. See CALIFORNIA CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CALIFORNIA CIVIL Dis-
COVERY PRACTICE § 3.2, at 93 (1975), where it states: "It is not clear how California
courts will interpret the legislative decision to include both 'refusal' and 'failure' in
CCP § 2034(a)."
150. Prior to the 1974 and 1978 amendments, an objection was not considered a
"refusal"; thus section 2034(a) was not available. 14 H. GROSSMAN & A. VAN ALSTYNE,
supra note 132, § 867, at 371.
5991981]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
does not comply with the order.1"1 In Stein v. Hassen'52 plain-
tiff served interrogatories on defendant who in turn filed un-
responsive answers. At the hearing on a motion to compel fur-
ther answers, the court ordered the defendant to make
additional answers and to pay plaintiff $150 in expenses, but
denied plaintiff's request for attorney's fees. When defendant
failed to comply with the order, plaintiff moved for a default
judgment and additional expenses of $150 which were
granted.
The appellate court found that defendant's answers were
indeed unresponsive and evasive, and that this constituted a
willful refusal to comply with discovery orders. Thus, under
section 2034(b)(2), the striking of defendant's answer and
counter-claim was justified.1s
However, the Fairfield court, in dicta, took the view that
section 2030(a) does not allow the imposition of sanctions.
Since the section does not provide for sanctions against the
objecting party, the court concluded that the making of an ob-
jection is not equivalent to a "refusal" to answer an interro-
gatory regardless of how insubstantial the matter might ap-
pear to the court.'" The court did hold that once a court has
issued an order under section 2030(a), it has inherent author-
ity to impose sanctions if the order is not obeyed.""5
151. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2030(a) (West Supp. 1981). In addition, the
section 2030(a) motion for further response must be made upon notice within 30 days
from the date of service of the answer or objections to the interrogatories unless the
court on notice enlarges the time. A motion to compel answers to interrogatories
under section 2034(a) on the other hand, has no statutory time limit if no answers
have been filed. See CALIFORNIA CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CALIFORNIA CIVIL
DISCOVERY PRACTICE § 3.19, at 102 (1975).
152. 34 Cal. App. 3d 294, 109 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1973).
153. It should be noted, however, that although the decision validates the use of
section 2034(b) (2) sanctions for failure to obey a court order under section 2030(a), it
did not determine whether or not expenses imposed on the defendant in the initial
section 2030(a) motion for further answers were valid. Id. at 300-02, 109 Cal. Rptr. at
325-26. But cf. Frey v. Superior Court, 237 Cal. App. 2d 201, 46 Cal. Rptr. 747 (1965),
where the court upheld the imposition of attorney's fees, finding that written objec-
tions to interrogatories were made without substantial justification. The court, how-
ever, based its action on section 2034(a), apparently classifying the written objection
as a "refusal" under the statute as it was then written.
154. Fairfield v. Superior Court, 246 Cal. App. 2d 113, 119, 54 Cal. Rptr. 721,
725 (1966).
155. Id. See also Stein v. Hassen, 34 Cal. App. 3d 294, 109 Cal. Rptr. 321
(1973); Sigerseth v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. App. 3d 427, 100 Cal. Rptr. 185 (1972);
Petersen v. City of Vallejo, 259 Cal. App. 2d 757, 781, 66 Cal. Rptr. 776, 791 (1968).
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Recently, in Deyo v. Kilbourne,5" the court concluded
that attorney's fees may be awarded under section 2030(a),
citing Frey v. Superior Court. 57 Noting that section 2034(a)
was amended in 1974 to provide for attorney's fees for "fail-
ure" or "refusal" of a party to answer interrogatories, the
court stated: "Clearly, a litigant who invokes a frivolous objec-
tion has not only failed to answer the question, but has set the
stage for a wholly unnecessary judicial proceeding."'"58
It is unclear whether or not attorney's fees may be
awarded in making a motion to require further answers under
section 2030(a), and whether or not an objection to an interro-
gatory constitutes a "refusal" or "failure" under section
2034(a).159 The California Rules of Court now recognize that a
court may impose expenses, including attorney's fees, on a
motion to compel answers or further answers to interrogato-
ries or requests for admissions.8 0
156. 84 Cal. App. 3d 771, 789-91 & n.23, 149 Cal. Rptr. 499, 513-14 & n.23
(1978).
157. 237 Cal. App. 2d 201, 46 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1965). See note 153 supra.
158. 84 Cal.. App. 3d at'789 n.23, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 514 n.23.
159. One commentator has argued that section 2034 sanctions are available on
section 2030(a) motions at least where the motion is caused by the interposing of
objections. See Dobyns, Sanctions and Interrogatories: Recent Developments, 7 OR-
ANGE COUNTY B.J. 7, 12 (1980).
Another writer has argued that wholly evasive answers or frivolous objections
must be considered a refusal to answer without substantial justification; to do other-
wise this author argues, would encourage subversion of the discovery process. CALI-
FORNIA CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CALIFORNIA CIVIL DISCOVERY PRACTICE §
8.63, at 50-51 (Supp. 1979).
The Los Angeles Superior Court has totally disregarded the Fairfield decision.
Their discovery manual interprets the term "refusal" in section 2034(a), stating that
"a 'refusal' usually consists of the interposition of an objection or legally insufficient
answer." L.A. Super. Ct. Disc. Manual, Rule 257A. In addition, their manual states
that the imposition of costs including attorney's fees are not sanctions. Id. Rule 257B.
160. A motion to compel answers or further answers to interrogatories or
requests for admissions or to protect the responding party shall include
a declaration stating facts to show that prior to the filing thereof counsel
for the moving party made a reasonable attempt to resolve the objec-
tions and disputed issues with opposing counsel but the attempt was
unsuccessful. If the court finds that there was no good reason for the
refusal or failure to resolve the matter, it may order any persons at fault
to pay to the moving party the amount of reasonable expenses incurred
in making the motion including reasonable attorney's fees.
CAL. R. CT. 222.1 (effective January 1, 1980).
This rule was recently interpreted in Leach v. Superior Court, 111 Cal. App. 3d
902, 169 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1980). In this case, the plaintiffs failed to answer or object to
interrogatories served upon them by the defendant. Even though the defendant sent
a letter to the plaintiff stating that a motion to compel answers would be filed if
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
Prior to the enactment of the 1974 amendment to section
2034(a), a party could move for an order requiring further an-
swers to a request for admissions, or the matters could be
deemed admitted if the other side "refused" to admit or deny
the request for admissions. 6' The 1974 amendment changed
the language in this provision to include a "refusal" or a "fail-
ure" to deny or admit a request for admissions. This change
brought section 2034(a) into conflict with section 2033(a),
which at that time, deemed matters automatically admitted
unless the party served either a sworn statement denying the
matter or a written objection. 6 ' The issue then arose as to
whether a failure to comply with a request for admissions au-
tomatically deemed the matters admitted under section
2033(a), or whether the requesting party had to make a mo-
tion under section 2034(a) to have the matters admitted. In
Zorro Investment Co. v. Great Pacific Securities Corp."6 the
problem was resolved. The court held that a failure to comply
with section 2033(a) was an automatic admission and that a
party need not make a motion under section 2034(a) to get
the matter admitted.
The 1978 amendment eliminated the statutory conflict.' 6"
As currently written, section 2033 requires that the request
for admissions be accompanied by a notice that the matters
requested will be deemed admitted unless the answering party
complies with the statute, e.g., files either a sworn denial, a
statement why he cannot truthfully admit or deny, or a writ-
ten objection. If the party fails to answer or object, the re-
questing party may serve notice on the other party that these
matters have been deemed admitted. Any right to apply for
plaintiff failed to answer, the trial court denied the defendant's motion to compel
answers to interrogatories on the basis that the defendant failed to comply with Cali-
fornia Rules of Court 222.1 (i.e., the defendant failed to make a reasonable attempt to
resolve objections and disputed issues with the plaintiff).
The court of appeals reversed, holding that California Rules of Court 222.1 does
not come into effect if a party totally fails to respond to a request for interrogatories.
The court supported its decision by reasoning that where a party does not answer or
object to interrogatories, there is no dispute for the opposing party to resolve.
161. See Cohen v. Superior Court, 63 Cal. App. 3d 184, 133 Cal. Rptr. 575
(1976) (deeming matters admitted under section 2034(a) is too severe a penalty for
failure to admit or deny when a party denied on the basis of information and belief).
162. See Zorro Inv. Co. v. Great Pac. Sec. Corp., 69 Cal. App. 3d 907, 912, 138
Cal. Rptr. 410, 412 (1977).
163. Id. at 917, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 415.
164. See CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE §§ 2033, 2034 (West Supp. 1981).
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relief under'section 473 must then be made within thirty days.
Under section 2034(a), a party may seek an order requir-
ing answers or further answers if the party receiving the re-
quest for admissions objects or does not comply with section
2033. If the responding party objects or the answer does not
comply with section 2033, then the court may assess expenses
against this party. Finally, if the court orders the party to fur-
nish answers or further answers and the party does not obey
this order, then the matters in the order will be deemed ad-
mitted subject to the restrictions on relief contained within
section 2033.
Section 2034(a) is now more similar to its counterpart,
rule 37(a), than it was before the 1974 and 1978 amendments.
In spite of the similarities, there are still noticeable differ-
ences. Rule 37(a) encompasses all failures to make discovery,
including objections. Although section 2034(a) now includes
all failures to make discovery, it is unclear whether or not ob-
jections were intended to be included within this classifica-
tion.'66 Also, rule 37(a) requires the assessment of expenses
against the failing party unless substantial justification can be
shown. On the other hand, section 2034 leaves the matter of
expenses to the discretion of the court. The final distinction
between the two sections is that sanctions are available under
rule 37 for all failures to comply with discovery, even an in-
complete or evasive answer. Objecting to an interrogatory in
California arguably forces the requesting party to move for a
further response under section 2030(a), which does not pro-
vide for expenses.
B. Section 2034(b)
Under the provision of section 2034(b), a court may pun-
ish as contempt the refusal of any person to obey a subpoena
or a court order under subsection (a). In addition, if a party
refuses to obey an order to compel under subsection (a), or
refuses to obey an order under section 2019, 2031, or 2032, the
court has discretion to make such orders as: 1) establishing
facts in favqr of the party obtaining the order; 2) refusing to
permit the disobedient party to oppose designated claims or
prohibiting the introduction of evidence; 3) striking out plead-
165. See text accompanying notes 150-60 supra.
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ings, or dismissing the action, or entering a default judgment;
4) requiring the payment of reasonable expenses; 5) directing
the arrest of the disobeying party; and 6) imposing sanctions
(1), (2), (3) as previously listed when a party fails to produce
another for examination under section 2032(a). 60
This provision generates problems of interpretation since
the term "refusal" is used by itself; the term "failure" is not
used. It is not clear whether or not this language suggests a
legislative intent that "refusal" require a showing of willful-
ness or bad faith. The legislative intent becomes even more
opaque when subsection (d) is examined, since this provision
specifically addresses "willfulness. ' 167 This may mean that
"willfulness" is not required unless it is specifically designated
in the statute. Under the Supreme Court's ruling in Societe
Internationale a "refusal" encompasses any failure to comply
with an order.' 86 It is doubtful that "refusal" encompasses any
failure to comply in California since subsection (a) was specifi-
cally amended to include the term "failure," but subsection
(b) was not similarly amended.' 69 In Deyo v. Kilbourne,'7 0 the
court stated that express findings of willfulness are required
under subdivision (d), but they are not required under subdi-
vision (b)(2).'7 The court did state that express findings
should be made when the sanction of dismissal is imposed.
Subsection (b) gives discretion to the trial court to deter-
mine the appropriate sanction, but "the sanction imposed
must be appropriate to the dereliction, must be authorized by
the discovery statutes, and must not exceed that which is nec-
essary to protect the interests of the party entitled to but de-
nied discovery.' 1 72 California courts have traditionally been
restrictive in applying sanctions because of the premise that
sanctions should be used only for aiding discovery, not for
166. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2034(b) (West Supp. 1981).
167. See H. GROSSMAN & A. VAN ALSTYNE, 14 CALIFORNIA PRACTICE § 876, at 387
(1972).
168. See text accompanying notes 39-42 supra.
169. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Heilman, 75 Cal. App. 3d 554, 565, 142 Cal.
Rptr. 390, 397 (1977) (court stated that when a party disobeys a court order sanctions
under section 2034(b)(2) may be imposed); Williams v. Travelers Ins. Co., 49 Cal.
App. 3d 805, 123 Cal. Rptr. 83 (1975) (court upheld dismissal for failure to answer
interrogatories although court interchanged the terms "refusal" and "failure").
170. 84 Cal. App. 3d 771, 149 Cal. Rptr. 499 (1978).
171. Id. at 797, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 519 (dictum).
172. Richards v. Superior Court, 86 Cal. App. 3d 265, 269, 150 Cal. Rptr. 77, 79
(1978).
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punishment.1" The California philosophy differs substantially
from that propounded by the Supreme Court in National
Hockey League, which allows sanctions for punishment as
well as for deterrent purposes.
Contempt has rarely been used as a sanction, but one ap-
pellate court upheld the imposition of this sanction where a
party consistently refused to answer questions at a deposition
in spite of court orders to answer.17 4
Some courts have also sanctioned parties by precluding
them from using evidence at trial. In In re Marriage of
Stallcup,1 75 the husband failed to produce documents and an-
swer questions as ordered by the court. This information was
necessary for a certified public accountant to report on the
community property involved in the divorce. The court or-
dered the husband several times to deliver these documents
and to answer the questions, but neither the documents nor
the answers were ever received. The appellate court upheld
the sanction of precluding the husband from using any of
these documents in evidence at trial, and found that there
had been a willful refusal to comply with court orders. This
finding was made even though the husband argued that the
documents had been delivered to his attorney, and that the
fault of the attorney should not be imputed to him. 17 6
Although California appellate courts are reluctant to sus-
tain dismissal as a sanction, there does appear to be some use
of this sanction by trial courts. In Housing Authority of Ala-
meda v. Gomez 7 the appellate court upheld the striking of
defendant's answer and entering a default judgment for his
refusal to comply with a court order to appear at a deposition.
In discussing this sanction the court stated:
Although the ultimate sanction of default is a drastic pen-
alty which should be sparingly used, the unsuccessful im-
position of a lesser sanction is not an absolute prerequi-
site to the utilization of the ultimate sanction; and the
test on appeal is whether the lower court abused its dis-
173. See, e.g., Evarone v. Twentieth Century Hosts, Inc., 98 Cal. App. 3d 90,
159 Cal. Rptr. 294 (1979); Caryl Richards, Inc. v. Superior Court, 188 Cal. App. 2d
300, 304, 10 Cal. Rptr. 377, 380 (1961).
174. In re Bongfeldt, 22 Cal. App. 3d 465, 99 Cal. Rptr. 428 (1971).
175. 97 Cal. App. 3d 294, 158 Cal. Rptr. 679 (1979).
176. See text and accompanying notes 67-75 supra.
177. 26 Cal. App. 3d 366, 102 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1972).
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cretion .... '"
The trial court in Stein v. Hassen1 79 ordered the defen-
dant to answer interrogatories and to pay plaintiff's expenses
under section 2034(a), but the defendant failed to pay the ex-
penses or file responsive answers. In upholding the striking of
defendant's answer and imposing a default judgment, the ap-
pellate court stated:
As to the court's finding of willfulness and lack of sub-
stantial justification for defendant's failure to give ade-
quate and sufficient answers, a reading of three sets filed
by defendant reflects his evasiveness and lack of good
faith, arrogant insolent attitude toward the judicial pro-
cess, dilatory tactics and attempt to play "fast and loose"
with the court."'0
But dismissal may be applied unjustly. In Morgan v.
Ransom 8 ' the appellate court found that dismissal for failure
to obey the trial court's order to answer interrogatories was
punitive because there was no showing that the defendant had
been prejudiced or that the interrogatory had a legitimate
purpose. This was a unique situation; the plaintiff was in jail
and filed the complaint pro se. The plaintiff did not learn of
the interrogatories until after the order to compel had been
made. He then filed handwritten answers and a motion to va-
cate when he learned of the court's actions. The court clerk,
however, refused to accept the answers since they were not
properly filed, i.e., not typed on legal paper. In light of these
circumstances, the court felt it would be unjust to impose
dismissal.
Federal Rule 37(b) differs from its California analog by
including all failures to comply with court orders requiring
discovery. Willfulness is not required, as is arguably the case
178. Id. at 371, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 659.
179. 34 Cal. App. 3d 294, 109 Cal. Rptr. 321 (1973).
180. Id. at 302, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 327. See also Kahn v. Kahn, 68 Cal. App. 3d
372, 137 Cal. Rptr. 332 (1977) (court upheld dismissal holding that a dismissal or-
dered as a discovery sanction constitutes a judgment on the merits); Williams v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 49 Cal. App. 3d 805, 123 Cal. Rptr. 83 (1975) (plaintiff's refusal to
answer interrogatories that went to the heart of his claim justified dismissal).
181. 95 Cal. App. 3d 664, 157 Cal. Rptr. 212 (1979). See also Duggan v. Moss, 98
Cal. App. 3d 735, 159 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1979) (dismissal could not be imposed under
section 2034(b)(2) since a prior order had not yet been disobeyed; a conditional order
of dismissal, ordering dismissal unless the party complied with the order, exceeded
the court's jurisdiction).
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under section 2034(b). Rule 37 no longer provides for the ar-
rest of a person disobeying court orders as section 2034 does;
it is now treated as a contempt of court. Section 2034(b) also
permits the court to impose expenses, while rule 37(b) re-
quires that expenses be imposed unless the failure was sub-
stantially justified.182 Also, rule 37(b) expressly includes all or-
ders to provide or permit discovery, whereas section 2034(b)
does not expressly include orders to file further answers to in-
terrogatories under section 2030(a). 183
C. Section 2034(c)
Under section 2034(c) if a party who is requested under
section 2033 to admit the genuineness of documents or admit
the truth of any matters of fact answers this request with a
sworn denial, and the requesting party later proves the truth
of the fact or genuineness of the documents, that party may
be entitled to expenses in making the proof. An order includ-
ing expenses should issue if: 1) there were no good reasons for
the denial; and 2) the admissions sought were of substantial
importance.
In Allen v. Pitchess18 4 the court upheld the imposition of
expenses for denying a request for admission in regards to the
authority of an agent. Appellants denied on the basis of lack
of information or belief. The court stated that the respondent
had proved that this denial was false, and that the fact was of
substantial importance; therefore, the costs involved in prov-
ing this fact were correctly imposed under section 2034(c).
In contrast, in Smith v. Circle P Ranch Co.,'8 5 the trial
court granted plaintiff's motion for expenses in the proof of
facts which the defendant wrongfully denied. However, the
appellate court held that the sanctions under section 2034(c)
were invalid since the defendant had answered that he was
unable to truthfully admit or deny. 86 Such an answer is not
182. See Pember v. Superior Court, 66 Cal. 2d 601, 604, 427 P.2d 167, 169, 58
Cal. Rptr. 567, 569 (1967) (even if the court finds that there was no substantial justifi-
cation for not complying with the order, the court is not required to award fees and
expenses).
183. It should be noted, however, that section 2034(b) sanctions now apply to
court orders under section 2019 because of the 1978 amendment.
184. 36 Cal. App. 3d 321, 330-32, 111 Cal. Rptr. 658, 664-65 (1973).
185. 87 Cal. App. 3d 267, 150 Cal. Rptr. 828 (1978).
186. Id. at 276-77, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 834-35. Sanctions are justified when a per-
son denied for lack of information or belief, but has access to the information, be-
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deemed a sworn denial under the statute; thus, the sanction
can be circumvented by claiming an inability to admit or
deny. 187
As explained previously, there is a significant "loophole"
in the section 2034(c) sanction since it only applies to sworn
denials; answers claiming an inability to admit or deny cir-
cumvent the sanction. Rule 37(c) on the other hand applies to
all failures to admit, including an inability to admit or
deny. '88 Although a party may seek further answers to admis-
sions under section 2034(a), 189 there is little chance of getting
the requested information admitted unless the requesting
party can show that the opposition has the ability to give a
definitive answer. Parties can effectively protect themselves
by merely stating an inability to admit or deny. Although
highly unethical, this form of "sandbagging" is not expressly
covered by the statute.
D. Section 2034(d)
Under section 2034(d), if a party or person willfully fails
to appear at a deposition or willfully fails to serve answers to
interrogatories, the court on notice and motion may strike
their pleadings, dismiss the action, enter a judgment by de-
fault, or impose other lesser penalties as it may deem just.
The court may also order the willfully failing party or his at-
torney to pay the moving party's expenses, including attor-
ney's fees, in making the motion.' 90 This provision has been
construed to mean that willfulness need not be proven by the
moving party. Instead, the burden of proving non-willfulness
is on the noncomplying party.' 91
cause that party has a duty to investigate. Id. at 275, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 834.
187. In addition, a court does not have to impose the section 2034(c) sanc-
tion-it has discretion. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Waller, 90 Cal. App. 3d 766,
154 Cal. Rptr. 12 (1979) (court upheld dismissal of 2034(c) motion stating that it was
far from clear that the plaintiff was deliberately dishonest in filing the denial and
that the trial court had discretion whether to deny or approve the motion): If a party
unnecessarily seeks admissions, his opponent may bring a suit for abuse of process.
See Twyford v. Twyford, 63 Cal. App. 3d 916, 134 Cal. Rptr. 145 (1976).
188. Advisory Committee's Statement, supra note 41, at 541; note 130 supra, at
373.
189. See text accompanying notes 146-47 supra.
190. See CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 2034(d) (West Supp. 1981).
191. Cornwall v. Santa Monica Dairy Co., 66 Cal. App. 3d 250, 135 Cal. Rptr.
761 (1977) (appellate court found that plaintiff exhibited willful conduct in failing to
keep his attorney apprised of his whereabouts so that interrogatories could be mailed
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Some courts have dismissed actions for failure of a party
to appear at a noticed deposition. 192 Others have first imposed
lesser sanctions, including monetary expenses, before impos-
ing dismissal or default for a continued, noncompliance. 193
In Thoren v. Johnston and Washer19 4 the court held that
a willfully false answer to an interrogatory must be treated as
no answer at all. Thus, where the falsity lay in the deliberate
omission of a witness's name, the trial court properly barred
any testimony by that witness under section 2034(d).196
A court cannot impose monetary sanctions under section
2034(d) if failure to appear at the deposition was not willful.
In Flynn v. Superior Court,96 plaintiff failed to appear at a
deposition because he had presented a motion to quash the
deposition. The court had instituted a stay until the hearing,
but the other party, believing the stay to be invalid, held dep-
osition proceedings anyway. The court found that the plaintiff
did not willfully fail to appear at the deposition; thus mone-
tary sanctions were inappropriate.
Sanctions applied without notice may also. violate due
process. In a recent case, Blumenthal v. Superior Court,197 the
appellate court annulled the sanctions that the trial court had
imposed against defendant's attorney. When defendant failed
to appear for a deposition, plaintiffs moved for sanctions
under section 2034(d). The trial court entered a default judg-
ment against the defendant, but it also ordered the defen-
dant's attorney to pay $1,000 to plaintiffs and their counsel.
The appellate court annulled this sanction because the mov-
ing papers did not mention the attorney, and thus he had no
notice sanctions which could be levied against him personally.
to him).
192. See, e.g., Kaplan v. Eld'orado Ins. Co., 55 Cal. App. 3d 587, 127 Cal. Rptr.
699 (1976).
193. See, e.g., Flood v. Simpson, 45 Cal. App. 3d 644, 119 Cal. Rptr. 675 (1975)
(court upheld entering of default judgment for continued failure to appear at deposi-
tion after monetary sanctions had been imposed and order by the court to appear had
been made).
194. 29 Cal. App. 3d 270, 105 Cal. Rptr. 276 (1972).
195. Id. at 274-76, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 278-79. But cf. Rangel v. Graybar Elec. Co.,
70 Cal. App. 3d 943, 139 Cal. Rptr. 191 (1977) (the trial court had barred the testi-
mony of plaintiff's expert witness, but the appellate court found an abuse of discre-
tion since there was a lack of substantial evidence indicating willful concealment of
the identity of the intended witness).
196. 89 Cal. App. 3d 491, 152 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1979).
197. 103 Cal. App. 3d 317, 163 Cal. Rptr. 39 (1980).
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To do otherwise the court held would be a denial of due
process.
Even though a trial court has discretion to impose sanc-
tions, it cannot apply them indiscriminately. In Richards v.
Superior Court 98 real parties in interest objected to interrog-
atories which sought financial information. The trial court
overruled the objections, but did issue a protective order to
shelter the confidentiality of the information. One of the par-
ties initially failed to comply with the request, and when the
party did comply, the court felt the information was insuffi-
cient. As a result of these actions, the court lifted the protec-
tive orders as to all parties, not just the non-complying party.
The appellate court held this was an abuse of discretion since
it "held four of the petitioners hostage to force compliance by
the fifth . . "199
The major difference between subdivision (d) and the
Federal Rules is that rule 37(d) applies to any failure to at-
tend a deposition or answer interrogatories; no finding of will-
fulness is required. Also, rule 37(d) states that the court shall
award expenses for failure to appear at a deposition or answer
an interrogatory. Section 2034(d) on the other hand, states
that a court may impose costs, but it is not mandatory. The
Federal Rules state that a failure to act cannot be excused on
the ground that discovery is objectionable unless the party
has applied for a protective order. California cases have
adopted this same concept100
IV. CONCLUSION
California discovery sanctions have unfortunately not
kept pace with the changes made in federal discovery sanc-
tions. Abusive discovery procedures which have been elimi-
nated in rule 37 still exist under section 2034. The language in
section 2034(a) pertaining to objections to interrogatories
must be clarified so that parties will know whether a motion
for further answers under section 2030(a), or a motion to com-
pel under section 2034(a), is required when an objection is
made. The confusing language in subsection (b) needs to be
198. 86 Cal. App. 3d 265, 150 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1978).
199. Id. at 270, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 79.
200. See Snyder v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. App. 3d 579, 585-86, 89 Cal. Rptr.
534, 538-39 (1970).
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rewritten to include all failures to obey court orders, not just
refusals. Subsection (c) needs modification to prevent parties
from circumventing sanctions by claiming an inability to ad-
mit or deny. The requirement of "willfulness" under section
2034(d) should be eliminated since it does not encompass all
failures to make discovery.
Monetary sanctions should be applied more frequently.
In furtherance of this policy, monetary sanctions should be
imposed upon all parties who refuse to comply with discovery
as required in rule 37. The provisions in section 2034 which
leave this decision to the discretion of the court should be
amended. If applied in conjunction with other sanctions, mon-
etary awards could become a more effective tool in preventing
misuse of discovery.
The policy in California that sanctions are to be used
only for remedial purposes needs to be reformed. California
courts must give greater recognition to the role that sanctions
can play in deterring parties and attorneys from misusing
discovery.
All courts need to recognize their responsibility in
preventing discovery abuse. Strict sanctions need to be em-
ployed in some cases in order to deter parties from engaging
in improper discovery tactics. Appellate courts must exercise
more restraint in reversing trial courts. The recent amend-
ments to section 2034 have brought California discovery sanc-
tions into closer congruence with federal sanctions, but more
changes need to be made if discovery is to be eliminated as a
tool for exploitation.
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